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INTRODUCTION
A common theme of modem financial analysis is that traditional
financial statements do not tell you enough. Some assert that
financial statements focus too much on the past and not enough on
the future. Some assert that financial statements do not adequately
focus on critical factors that create long-term value. Some assert that
financial statements need to focus more on the separate segments of
the enterprise. In the broadest sense, many assert that traditional fi-
nancial statements simply do not sufficiently focus on just what users
need.'
1. The underlying sentiment was captured fairly vividly in an article last April in
Forbes. Financial writer William Davidow observed:
To put it bluntly, reported profits have become increasingly meaningless.
You won't get very far explaining this to your banker or to your sharehold-
ers, but it's undeniably true. Basically, profits measure the rate of change in
a company's assets. Increase assets by $10 million and you report a $10 mil-
lion profit. Write down $25 million in inventory and profits go down by the
same amount.
Double-entry bookkeeping, developed by Luca Pacioli in 1494, lets busi-
nesses keep track of changes in their asset base. But this system, still in use
today, deals primarily with tangible assets such as cash, inventory, accounts
receivable, factory plants and equipment. It ignores intangible assets: good-
will, employee knowledge, quality of management, customer relationships,
1988 [Vol. 65
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In truth, many of the criticisms make fair points. And in 1991, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA")
formed a Special Committee on Financial Reporting---commonly re-
ferred to as the "Jenkins Committee," after its chair Edmund Jen-
kins-to assess the needs of users of financial information and to
recommend improvements in financial reporting. The Jenkins Com-
mittee found a broad consensus that, while financial statements re-
mained "an excellent framework for capturing and organizing
financial information," they could be made better.2 Among other
things, the Jenkins Committee found that, to meet users' changing
needs, business reporting must provide more information with a for-
ward-looking perspective; focus more on those factors that create
long-term value, including non-financial measures; and better align
the information reported externally with the information reported to
senior management.3 The Jenkins Committee proposed a new "model
of business reporting," with a look noticeably different from the finan-
information infrastructure, trade secrets, patents, etc. What companies re-
port today are really "old profits" based on changes in tangible assets. But
any meaningful measure of profits would have to include the rate of change
in the total asset base-both tangible and intangible.
William Davidow, Why Profits Don't Matter, Forbes ASAP, Apr. 8, 1996, at 24,24; see
also Andrea Gabor, The Man Who Discovered Quality- How W. Edwards Deming
Brought the Quality Revolution to America-The Stories of Ford, Xerox, and GM 7
(1990) ("Another problem is that legally mandated financial statements are little
more than 'a fuzzy approximation of a distant past,' notes Professor John Whitney of
Columbia University Business School .... ."); Justin Fox, Searching for Nonfiction in
Financial Statements, Fortune, Dec. 23, 1996, at 39, 39 ("Financial statements-in par-
ticular the earnings numbers they produce-have actually become less reliable as a
measure of corporate performance and value.... The Generally Accepted Account-
ing Principles, set by FASB, don't allow for some of the prime drivers of corporate
success-investments in intangible assets such as know-how, patents, brands, and cus-
tomer loyalty."); Jeffrey M. Laderman, Earnings Schmernings-Look at the Cash,
Bus. Week, July 24, 1989, at 56, 56 ("[S]ome savvy investors say the singular focus on
net income is foolhardy."); Dana W. Linden, Lies of the Bottom Line, Forbes, Nov.
12, 1990, at 106, 106 ("Reported earnings have become virtually worthless in terms of
their ability to tell us what's really going on at a company."); SEC Sponsors Discus-
sions on Future of Financial Reporting, J. Acct., Apr. 1996, at 15, 15 ("We need to
investigate the current accounting model with a critical eye, because it is not keeping
pace with the changes in the business world." (quoting SEC commissioner Steven M.
H. Wallman)); Steven M.H. Wallman, Regulation for a New World, Bus. L Today,
Nov.Dec. 1996, at 8, 8 [hereinafter Wallman, Regulation for a New World] ("Disclo-
sure requirements and accounting principles designed for stable industrial businesses
are not necessarily cost-effective, or even appropriate, when applied to volatile knowl-
edge-based start-ups.").
2. Special Committee on Financial Reporting, AICPA, Improving Business Re-
porting-A Customer Focus: Meeting the Information Needs of Investors and Credi-




cial statements of today.4 The Jenkins Committee recommendations
continue to be the subject of debate.'
It is almost universally acknowledged, however, that a significant
impediment to the improvement of financial reporting is the risk of
litigation. As one leader of the accounting profession has complained,
"It is very difficult to be innovative if you are always concerned that
every new service you offer could be subject to significant liability."'6
The basic problem is that improvement in the systems of financial re-
porting will largely involve a trend away from objectively verifiable
data into data that is more subjective and therefore based on judg-
ment. This increases the litigation risk, insofar as a trend to subjective
data increases the opportunity for second-guessing, particularly when
things do not turn out as planned. Where the data is objective, judg-
ment is limited and the evidence is clear. Where the data is subjective,
an expert can almost always be found to give a jury something to think
about.
The result is that the world of financial reporting-and the account-
ing profession in particular-is faced with a conundrum. On the one
hand, there is justifiable demand for improvement in financial report-
ing. On the other hand, any change in that direction will, where the
profession has given assurance as to more modem presentations of
data, potentially increase its exposure to litigation. While courts have
shown increasing sensitivity to the problems of litigation in financial
reporting, they do not seem to appreciate the extent to which the liti-
gation risk is freezing progress in its tracks.7
4. The Jenkins Committee's proposed model contains five "major components":
(1) "Financial and Non-Financial Data"; (2) "Management's Analysis of Financial and
Non-Financial Data"; (3) "Forward-Looking Information"; (4) "Information about
Management and Shareholders"; (5) "Background about the Company." Id. at 136.
5. See Jenkins Report Symposium, J. Acct., Sept. 1996, at 19, 19; see also Peter D.
Fleming, What's Next for the Business Reporting Model, J. Acct., Dec. 1996, at 14, 14
("[SEC Commissioner Steven Walman] said the current financial reporting model
was not working as well as it might and the one proposed by the Jenkins committee
was worthy of review to see if it could provide users with better information.").
6. John von Brachel, Reinventing the CPA, J. Acct., Nov. 1996, at 49, 50 (com-
ments of Robert Mednick). For its part, the Jenkins Committee concluded that a
consequence of the litigation risk "is to deprive users of information and inhibit the
progress in business reporting that comes from experience with voluntary disclosure."
Jenkins Committee Report, supra note 2, at 116.
7. The chilling effect of the litigation risk is very much in evidence in the Jenkins
Committee Report itself. For example, while earnestly advocating greater emphasis
on forward-looking information, the report cautioned that "[c]ompanies should not
have to expand reporting of forward-looking information until there are more effec-
tive deterrents to unwarranted litigation that discourages companies from doing so."
Jenkins Committee Report, supra note 2, at 57 (emphasis omitted). Subsequent to
publication of the Jenkins Committee Report, Congress has enacted the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, one of the purposes of which was to address
this concern. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1996)).
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It is in this context that a new committee of the AICPA has been
formed. It is the Special Committee on Assurance Services-infor-
mally referred to as the "Elliott Committee," after its chair Robert
Elliott. The charge of the Elliott Committee is to "analyze and report
on the current state and future of the audit/assurance function and the
trends shaping the audit/assurance environment, focusing on the cur-
rent and changing needs of users of decision-making information and
other stakeholders in the audit/assurance process and how best to im-
prove the related services."' As an important part of its mission, the
Elliott Committee is to assess the future evolution of financial report-
ing systems and to identify and develop new assurance services that
improve the quality and usefulness of financial information.
Last month, the Elliott Committee issued its report.9 In discussing
the future of CPA assurance services, the report posits the develop-
ment, in the not-too-distant future, of a financial reporting system in
which the principal vehicle for the transmission of financial informa-
tion may be a computer network accessible on a "real time" basis by
the reporting entity and its investors, creditors, suppliers, customers,
and analysts.10 The accounting professional in such a system evolves
from one who provides annual assurance on historical financial state-
ments into one who, among other things, provides real-time or "just-
in-time" assurance to facilitate reliable interactive communication."
8. Board of Directors, AICPA, Charge to AICPA Special Committee on Assur-
ance Services (Apr. 22, 1994). For a discussion of the work undertaken by the Elliott
Committee, see The CPA Journal Symposium on the Future of Assurance Services,
CPA J., May 1996, at 14, 14; Robert Mednick, Chair's Corner, The CPA Letter, Dec.
1996, at 9; Don Pallais, Assurance Services: Where We Ar" Where We're Going, J.
Acct., Sept. 1996, at 16, 16; Professional Growth Through New Assurance Services,
The CPA Letter, JanJFeb. 1996, at 5; Rick Telberg, CPA Leaders Forge New Vision,
Acct Today, Nov. 25-Dec. 15, 1996, at 1, 1; von Brachel, supra note 6, at 50-51.
9. Special Committee on Assurance Services, AICPA, Report of the Special
Committee on Assurance Services (1997) [hereinafter Elliott Committee Report].
The Elliott Committee Report has been published exclusively on the AICPA's Web
site. See Eliott Committee Report (published Mar. 19, 1997) <httpJ/vww.aicpa.org/
assurancelscaslindex.htm>.
10. Id. at <http'//www.aicpa.orgassurance/scascomstudeffect/newopps.htm>.
11. Users will need data assurance at points in time other than just at the end
of a year or quarter. Some users may require "continuous audits" of a broad
data set, others "just-in-time audits" of key transactions or data, and still
others mixes of the two. When users' real-time access to databases becomes
routine, they will need continuous data assurance.
Id- The Committee anticipates that such enhanced financial information services may
be paid for by the reporting entity, the financial information user, or both. Id. at
<http://www.aicpa.orgassurance/scascomstud/effect/constr.htm>.
The subject of such real-time or "just-in-time" assurance was the focus of a talk this
past December by SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman. In describing his vision of
technology's impact on financial reporting, Wallman reportedly
pointed to a shift to "process attestation" from "substance attestation" with
certifications of data disseminated through new information technologies.
Thus, accountants of the future would attest to the integrity of the system
that a company uses to generate data relating to its operations, rather than
to the integrity of the data per se.
1997] 1991
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The Elliott Committee hypothesizes the transmission of both purely
financial and certain types of non-financial information.
The Elliott Committee Report also addresses the litigation risk. Ba-
sically, the report outlines a series of risk-management proposals ap-
plicable to accountant assurance services;' 2 these include the
enhancement of risk management through such devices as the use of
cautionary language, a change of the vehicles of liability from tort to
contract, loss-limiting clauses, alternative dispute resolution provi-
sions, and explicit consideration of litigation risk in the development
of new assurance services.' 3 Many of the Elliott Committee's risk-
management proposals are based on established legal precepts. Some
explore risk management in areas in which the law has yet to develop.
This Article outlines the legal precepts underlying the Elliott Com-
mittee's risk-management proposals in one particularly important
area in which the law has yet to develop: liability as the systems of
financial reporting shift from paper to a computer network such as the
Internet. This Article addresses four issues. First, it addresses the lia-
bility risk of accountants disseminating financial information over the
Internet. Second, it addresses the possibility of enhancing risk man-
agement by shifting the avenues of liability from tort to contract.
Third, it discusses the enhancement of risk management by making
full use of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, both as that doctrine is
embodied in common law and, more recently, in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.14 Fourth, it addresses risk manage-
ment in the context of computer-disseminated financial information
outside the United States. The Article's purpose is to familiarize the
accounting profession, those responsible for structuring financial re-
porting relationships, governmental authorities, the courts, and others
as to both the potential liability arising out of computer-disseminated
financial information, and how that liability may be managed in a way
that facilitates honest financial reporting while still permitting finan-
cial reporting systems the flexibility to evolve.
Rachel Witmer, SEC's Wallman Describes View of Technology's Impact on Account-
ing, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1531, 1532 (Dec. 13, 1996).
12. The Elliott Committee's risk-management proposals address risk management
in the context of the full scope of assurance services analyzed and reported on by the
committee. The discussion here is limited to aspects of the risk management propos-
als in the context of financial reporting.
13. Elliott Committee Report, supra note 9, at <http://www.aicpa.org/assurance/
scas/majtheme/svdliab/index.htm>.
14. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1996)).
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I. RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPUTER-DISSEMINATED
FINANCIAL INFORMATION
A. Overview
It is certainly true that one of the most significant changes in finan-
cial reporting may not involve the substance of the information, but
the means by which it is transmitted.'" An ever-growing consensus
acknowledges that transmission by paper, while serving civilization
admirably for more than a thousand years, is outdated.' 6 And it is
increasingly apparent that the future systems of financial reporting
will turn away from paper and move largely or entirely to real-time
computer-based-perhaps Internet-basedl 7-transmissions. 8  In a
15. "Information technology is probably the single most important factor affecting
future information flows and CPA services. It affects all aspects of the CPA's work:
how and when information is created, processed, stored, communicated, acquired, re-
fined, and interpreted-as well as how CPAs will both produce and communicate
assurance." Report of the Chairman of the AICPA Special Committee on Assurance
Services to AICPA Council 4 (Oct. 1995).
16. See Davidow, supra note 1, at 24 ("New technologies have fundamentally
changed the way we do business.... But while so much else has undergone a seismic
shift, the way business continues to account for profits remains as outmoded as the
clipper ship."); Steven M.H. Wallman, Regulating in a World of Technological and
Global Change, Metropolitan Corp. Couns., Oct. 1996, at 1, 64 [hereinafter Walman,
Regulating in a World of Technological and Global Change] ("[T]he continued growth
of the Internet presents even more of an opportunity for expansion in financial serv-
ices through the use of technology."); Waliman, Regulation for a New World, supra
note 1, at 8 ("Technology, and the Internet in particular as the first worldwide interac-
tive mass communication vehicle, is especially critical in forcing us to refashion the
way we think about regulation.").
17. SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman has recently observed: "I think we will
really see innovation in this area, over the Internet and through proprietary systems,
including- more real-time individual consumer securities trading; and the providing of
more real-time disaggregated financial information through access to select portions
of a company's management information system." Walman, Regulating in a World of
Technological and Global Change, supra note 16, at 64; see also Wallman, Regulation
for a New World, supra note 1, at 10 ("Increasingly, we have issuers seeking just-in-
time capital,' as they have previously sought just-in-time inventory.").
18. Already the vehicles of transmission of financial information are rapidly shift-
ing from paper to computer. See Gerard R. Boyce, Offering and Trading Securities on
the Internet, N.Y. LJ., May 9, 1996, at 3, 3 ("The Spring Street Brewing Company's
Internet-based initial public offering and trading scheme has generated significant me-
dia attention."); Jack Egan, Ready, Se4 Search, U.S. News & World Rep., Apr. 29,
1996, at 64, 68 ("'We'll also be able to provide access to valuable private information
like Dun & Bradstreet business credit reports.' In tandem with IBM's 'cryptolope,'
(for encrypted envelope) such value-added data will be sent over the Internet to users
who pay a fee."); Michael Gianturco, Investing on the Web Surf and Grow Rich!,
Forbes ASAP, June 3, 1996, at 36, 36 ("There is a lot of free stuff for investors on the
Internet.... [The INVESTools Website is] great for reading investment resources
like investment newsletters, opinion pieces, helpful lists of money managers and ad-
visers, and books and periodicals."); Journal Introduces Interactive Edition, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 29, 1996, at B1 ("The Wall Street Journal today introduces its Interactive Edi-
tion, an electronic newspaper that works through the burgeoning Internet to deliver
high-quality, timely business news and information around the clock and around the
globe."); Thomas McCarroll, Investors Rush the Net, Time, June 3, 1996, at 54, 56
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world in which the financial markets are influenced almost instantane-
ously by electronically-reported events and developments, financial
information that comes plodding along three months after year-end in
an annual report or Form 10-K may increasingly seem somewhere be-
tween useless and absurd.' 9
("[T]he movement to the Internet has tremendous momentum, and Wall Street knows
better than to swim against the tide."); Vanessa O'Connell, Stock Answer, Wall St. J.,
June 17, 1996, at R8 ("Buying and trading securities on the Web could revolutionize
the relationship between investors and brokerage firms."); Michael Selz, Small Stock
Issuers Find a New Market on the Internet, Wall St. J., May 14, 1996, at B2 ("Entrepre-
neurs are creating Web pages that help investors purchase stock directly from small
issuers, which don't interest most underwriters."); Rick Telberg, CPA Societies Click
with Net Developer, Acct. Today, May 20-June 2, 1996, at 1, 1 ("More than 30 state
CPA societies have signed on with a nascent Seattle-based Internet developer to join
the traffic on the information superhighway."); Thomas E. Weber, Ernst & Young's
Consulting Services to Be Sold on Internet for Annual Fee, Wall St. J., May 21, 1996, at
B10 ("Ernst & Young is expected to begin selling its consulting services over the In-
ternet, offering small businesses a chance to query the firm's experts electronically in
exchange for a flat-fee annual subscription. The move, expected to be announced
today, marks the first major effort by a Big Six accounting firm to embrace the In-
teret to distribute its services.").
The transmission of financial information has come a long way:
When Charles Dow and Edward Jones first launched their business-news
enterprise in 1882, they disseminated the news on "flimsies," essentially
sheets of carbon paper with the handwritten news on it. A clerk pressing
hard on the paper could generate up to-24 flimsies at a time: runners carried
these to businessmen and speculators ....
John R. Dorfman, Sending News over Broad Tape, Wall St. J., May 6, 1996, at C1.
19. This point is being made with increasing frequency. In September 1994, Rob-
ert Elliott observed, "[t]he audit also is threatened by the fact that annual printed
financial statements may be destined for history's scrap heap because information
technology permits far more frequent and timely reports." Robert K. Elliott, The Fu-
ture of Audits, J. Acct., Sept. 1994, at 74, 75. More recently, the chairman of the
Financial Accounting Foundation has commented:
Your annual reports and even your 1OQs are pretty much ancient history
by the time they're prepared and distributed.... All the effort that goes into
preparing them and being sure they meet the requisite standards of accuracy
and completeness is something of a wasted effort because by the time they
reach the marketplace, the marketplace has long since absorbed the infor-
mation from other sources.
Glenn Cheney, Cook Defends Independence, Pushes for Global Standards, Acct. To-
day, Nov. 25-Dec. 15, 1996, at 16, 20 [hereinafter Cheney, Cook Defends Indepen-
dence] (quoting chairman of the Financial Accounting Foundation J. Michael Cook).
One popular anecdote involves a foods manufacturer that reportedly offered share-
holders their choice of the company's annual report or a free pound of cookies. Most
shareholders went for the cookies. Id.
An obvious consequence of expedited systems of financial reporting is that, if the
accounting profession is to keep up, there will not be enough time within the con-
straints of real-time financial reporting for an "audit" in the traditional sense to take
place. It is for that reason, among others, that the emphasis will almost inevitably
shift from audits of financial statements to assurance as to financial reporting systems.
See discussion infra part III.C; see also Elliott Committee Report, supra note 9, at
<http'J/www.aicpa.org/assurance/scas/Comstud/effect/constr.htm> ("Real-time audit-
ing, for example, will require a far better understanding of systems and systems relia-
bility."); Professional Growth Through New Assurance Services, supra note 8, at 6
("Information technology is probably the single most important factor influencing fu-
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One need not think too deeply before recognizing that the liability
implications, if left unmanaged by the profession, are potentially stag-
gering.20 The availability of Internet-transmitted information may
mean that everyone in the computer-owning world-at least to the
extent they choose to become subscribers to the professional service
at issue-may end up as a putative plaintiff should transmitted infor-
mation turn out to be wrong.21 And note that attention must focus
upon liability throughout the world. There is no existing barrier that
would limit the litigation exposure to those in the United States. 2
If ever there were a litigation risk to stop innovation in its tracks,
this would seem to be it. The situation, however, is not without hope.
ture information flows and CPA services.... In the future, investors, creditors and
others with valid interests may be allowed access through [Electronic Data In-
terchange] to a company's data base ... ."). As noted in the CPA Journal:
This new paradigm in the world of the accounting profession starts with a
decision maker making inquiries (or having direct access to the data base) of
an enterprise and then seeking corroboration from the auditor that the infor-
mation he or she obtained online on a real-time basis is true. It will look like
a network of information flying around in various directions.
The CPA Journal Symposium on the Future of Assurance Services, supra note 8, at 16.
20. If the liability implications are potentially staggering, so are the opportunities
for fraud. Last May, for example, the Wall Street Journal described a company whose
stock quickly quintupled as a result of "[o]ne positive earnings report and literally
thousands of messages over The Motley Fool, an on-line bulletin board on America
Online.... [S]ome of these cyberscribes, both bulls and bears, have taken liberties
with the truth, adding to the stock's 'volatility."' Roger Lowenstein, Who's the Fool in
Iomega's Skyrocket?, Wall St. J., May 23, 1996, at Cl; see also SEC v. Western Execu-
tive Group, Inc., No. 96-6938 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 1996) (involving SEC procurement of
a temporary restraining order in the largest reported Internet investment fraud to
date); Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Regulating Internet Advertising, N.Y. LJ.,
May 14, 1996, at 3, 3 ("The use of the Internet to transmit ads containing fraudulent
claims or consumer 'scams' comprises an area of growing concern for federal and
state authorities."); Jeffrey Taylor, SEC Has a Message for the Media: We Are Keep-
ing Our Eyes on You, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1996, at C1 ("In particular, regulators worry
that the proliferation of media activity, in newsletters and on the Internet, allows
people who are bearish on a stock to grind their axes in print and provide a road map
for other bears to sell the stock as well.").
21. Even under the conservative "Ultramares rule," one in privity with an account-
ant may potentially state a claim for negligent misrepresentation. See Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931); see also Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 483 N.E. 2d 110 (N.Y. 1985) (reaffirming the Ultramares rule).
22. As one author recently has observed-
And, just as events in cyberspace thus take place "nowhere," they also can
be characterized as taking place everywhere at once, in the sense that the
effects of on-line activities are felt simultaneously in every comer of the
global network. A World Wide Web page located on a machine in, say, Ber-
lin can be accessed just as easily by users in Frankfort, Kentucky, as by those
in Frankfurt, Germany. All jurisdictions simultaneously feel the effects of
the information posted there, and thus all would appear to have equal claims
to make the law governing the content of this site-surely a recipe for inter-
national chaos.
David Post, The New Electronic Federalism, Am. Law., Oct. 1996, at 93, 93; see also
Wallman, Regulation for a New World, supra note 1, at 10 ("It is difficult and expen-
sive to limit the geographic reach or audience in an Interet-based world.").
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Developing judicial precedent suggests that the law is coming to rec-
ognize the benefits of computer-disseminated financial information,
and is developing an increasing recognition of a need to limit the liti-
gation risk. To the extent the profession makes the leap to a com-
puter-based information source providing financial information to a
wide audience, it may gain the benefit of these judicial developments
which, while not eliminating risk entirely, may make it more
manageable.
B. Technological Innovation and the Law
Ironically, what may be the most important case affecting computer
dissemination of CPA-associated financial information in the United
States was decided by a low-level, New York state court decades
before the computer was even invented. The case is Jaillet v. Cash-
man,23 and it involved a then-innovative device for reporting financial
information-the ticker service. On March 8, 1920, Dow Jones & Co.
misreported over its ticker service the effect of a court decision on the
taxable status of stock dividends as income. An investor saw the re-
port, believed stock prices were going to drop, and sold. In fact, the
Dow Jones report was wrong, and when its report was corrected the
market rose. In a move that would be widely imitated in subsequent
decades, the investor sued. The claim was against Dow Jones for neg-
ligence in misreporting the effects of the court decision.24
The court sustained a demurrer-or, in modem parlance, dismissed
the complaint. True, the court conceded, Dow Jones had a "moral
obligation" not to say anything that was untrue.2 5 But a moral obliga-
tion did not necessarily give rise to legal liability. To permit a negli-
gence claim, the court reasoned, would establish a precedent whereby
"there was a liability by the defendant to every member of the com-
munity who was misled by the incorrect report. 21 6 Considerations of
"practical expediency," the court said, made dismissal of such a com-
plaint "absolutely necessary. 27
Fast-forward to the 1980s, and we see that the law has continued to
develop in order to accommodate technological innovation. In the in-
tervening half-century, Dow Jones has improved immeasurably its fi-
nancial information systems, developing, among other things, the Dow
Jones News/Retrieval Service, providing to about 200,000 subscribers
real-time financial news accessed by computer. The system works as
follows:
23. 189 N.Y.S. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1921), affid, 194 N.Y.S. 947 (App. Div. 1922), affd,
139 N.E. 714 (N.Y. 1923).






The subscriber telephones defendant's computer. Then, by use of a
personal computer and modem, a device which converts computer
signals for telephone transmission, the subscriber enters the neces-
sary passwords and access codes to set up an instantaneous, continu-
ous, "interactive" "on-line" linkage with defendant's computer, thus
allowing access to the Dow Jones News Service.28
Alas, while the technology has improved, Dow Jones is still making
mistakes. Thus, when the Canadian corporation Husky Oil under-
went a restructuring, Dow Jones disseminated over its computer sys-
tem a report on the restructuring, but neglected to mention that the
prices referred to were in Canadian, not United States, dollars. An
investor (who happened to be a law student) lost money in alleged
reliance on the Dow Jones report and sued.29 The claim was for negli-
gent misrepresentation.3"
Again, Dow Jones found itself litigating a significant technological
issue in a low-level New York state court. For the court itself, the case
presented a dilemma. On the one hand, the court acknowledged that
New York had "long recognized" a claim for negligent misrepresenta-
tion.3 1 On the other hand, the court also acknowledged that a failure
to dismiss that claim might nip in the bud a developing technology.2
The court thus framed the issue as one of technological develop-
ment needing to be accommodated by the strictures of the law. Her-
aiding back to the time when "town criers.., for centuries informed
the local citizenry," the court stated:
With the inexorable march of time has come an age of technology
of previously unimagined dimensions. Methods for news delivery
have advanced apace with general scientific achievements. While
town criers had for centuries informed the local citizenry, general
circulation newspapers eventually made criers superfluous. Early in
this century, news, transmitted by radio and telephone, became
available to subscribers through dedicated news tickers and to the
public by "extra" editions of newspapers. Widely available radio
and television made news known to the public within minutes of its
occurrence. In the last few years, instantaneous news has become
available to subscribers with access to a microcomputer and a tele-
phone, even at home.
Do technological advances require rethinking legal principles that
have existed for previous modalities? Do modem techniques for
delivering the news change the rules applicable to its providers?
This case raises the question of whether the providing of a premium
service for instantaneous transmission of the news by computer-to-
28. Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334, 335 (Civ. Ct. 1987).
29. Id
30. Id. at 335-36.
31. Id. at 336.
32. Id. at 338, 340 (declaring the need to evaluate new forms of technology in
accordance with established legal rules).
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computer linkup places the news service at greater risk to readers
than does the providing of the same news by another modality.33
The court's holding was that technology won and the law lost.
More precisely, the court held that the complaint was to be dismissed,
largely for reasons of policy. Looking to the Restatement of Torts and
its limitation on claimants for negligent misrepresentation to "one of a
limited group of persons, 34 the court held that "as a matter of public
policy, the class of potential plaintiffs must be carefully circumscribed
to avoid the potential of unlimited liability. ' 35 Here, there was not a
sufficiently close relationship to permit the investor to state a claim:
The relationship between the parties here is the same as between
any subscriber and a news service; it is functionally identical to that
of a purchaser of a newspaper. The advances of technology bring
the defendant's service into the home or office of more than 200,000
persons; indeed even non-subscribers may receive defendant's ser-
vice through computerized linkages with other database enterprises.
There is no functional difference between defendant's service and
the distribution of a moderate circulation newspaper or subscription
newsletter. The instantaneous, interactive, computerized delivery
of defendant's service does not alter the facts: plaintiff purchased
defendant's news reports as did thousands of others. The "special
relationship" required to allow an action for negligent misstate-
ments must be greater than that between the ordinary buyer and
seller.36
For support, the court relied largely upon the "rule in Jaillet" as estab-
lished more than fifty years earlier.37
C. The Basic Rule
The basic rule that emerges from these two cases, and a number of
others,38 applies generally to those who disseminate, through media-
type channels, financial and other information. The rule appears to be
that one who disseminates financial or other information through pub-
licly-available media will generally be immune from a claim based on
33. Ia at 335.
34. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(2)(a) (1977) [hereinafter Torts
Restatement].
35. Daniel, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
36. d at 337-38.
37. Id at 338.
38. See First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir.
1989); First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 670 F. Supp. 115, 118 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), aff'd, 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989); Gale v. Value Line, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 967, 971
(D.R.I. 1986); Daniel, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 336; Jaillet v. Cashman, 189 N.Y.S. 743 (Sup.
Ct. 1921), aff'd, 194 N.Y.S. 947 (App. Div. 1922), affid, 139 N.E. 714 (N.Y. 1923);
Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Ohio 1986).
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negligence 39 where the disseminated information is false.4" That the
rule is applicable to financial information, according to the courts, has
been established by "the rule enunciated in Jaillet... immunizing dis-
seminators of financial information from tort liability for non-defama-
tory negligent misstatements.'
The rationale for this rule is one of (rare for the law in the area of
financial reporting) common sense and "practical expediency. '42 The
economic reality, the courts seem to recognize, is that "the potential
number of persons to whom a publication might become available is
without limit," and the existence of claims sounding in negligence
would cause the disseminator to face "the spectre of unlimited liabil-
ity" which would "have a staggering deterrent effect on the dissemina-
tion" of information.43 The doctrinal soundness of the rule is in part
demonstrated by its intellectual consistency with a fundamental princi-
ple of negligence as embodied in the Restatement, which limits a
claim for negligent misrepresentation to the "loss suffered... by the
person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
39. A claim predicated upon the negligence of an accountant will typically take
one of two forms: a claim for negligent misrepresentation or a claim for negligence.
The elements of each claim are in substance the same, see Standard Chartered PLC v.
Price Waterhouse, Nos. 1 CA-CV 93-0461, 1 CA-CV 93-0442, 1996 WL 640702, at *24
(Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 1996) ("We have stated that the gravamen of [plaintiff's] audi-
tor negligence claim is negligent misrepresentation."), though-depending on the law
of the particular state at issue-other differences between the two claims may exist.
In California, for example, only the accountant's client or a third-party beneficiary of
the accountant's engagement contract may state a claim for negligence, whereas a
somewhat broader class may state a claim for negligent misrepresentation. See Bily v.
Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992). The rule articulated in Jaillet would
appear to apply to both negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims.
40. See First Equity Corp., 869 F.2d at 180 ("The publication at issue is a source of
information disseminated to a wide public.... In such circumstances, we believe that
a user is in the best position to weigh the danger of inaccuracy and potential loss ....
That being the case, the user should bear the risk of failing to verify the accuracy of a
summary in the absence of proof of a knowing misstatement."); First Equity Corp.,
670 F. Supp. at 118 (applying Jaillet rule to Standard & Poor's, where "it is the fact
that the size of [the user class] is indeterminate which raises the potential for unlim-
ited liability, which concern is the foundation of the Jaillet rule"); Gale, 640 F. Supp. at
971 (holding that the publisher of a fairly widespread investment advisory newsletter
would not be liable for an incomplete description of a warrant when "the information
was simply and inadvertently omitted from the publication for a period of time");
Gutter, 490 N.E.2d at 902 (finding the Wall Street Journal not liable for an inaccuracy,
stating that "we... conclude that a complaint alleging that a newspaper reader or
subscriber relied to his detriment in making securities investments based on a negli-
gent and inaccurate report in a newspaper does not state a cause of action in tort
against the newspaper's publisher for 'negligent misrepresentation"').
41. First Equity Corp., 869 F.2d at 178. Although the Jaillet decision has been
adopted by a number of jurisdictions outside New York, in In re Taxable Municipal
Bond Sec. Litig., No. Civ. A. MDL No. 863, 1993 WL 591418, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 29,
1993), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana observed
that the Fifth Circuit had not adopted the doctrine.
42. First Equity Corp., 670 F. Supp. at 117.
43. Id (quotations omitted).
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guidance" the information is intended to be provided." When a pub-
licly-accessible vehicle of transmission is used-whether it be a news-
paper, a ticker-tape, a financial newsletter, or a global computer
network-the information is not being disseminated to "a limited
group. 45 It is being disseminated to everybody.
Nor does it appear to be a prerequisite to the Jaillet rule that the
media vehicle be of any particular type, be particularly well known, or
have a particularly large number of subscribers. The Jaillet rule has
been found applicable to interactive computer services, 46 newspa-
pers,47 a Standard & Poor's publication called "Value Line Con-
vertibles"' 8 (which ranked convertible securities and evaluated
warrants), and newsletters.49 It has been applied when the number of
subscribers has been as little as 2200.50 And, to anticipate an impor-
tant issue, the Jaillet rule limits negligent misrepresentation claims
even by those who have entered an explicit agreement with the dis-
seminator. "A subscriber is not significantly different from other pur-
chasers of a publication merely because he pays for it on a more or
less regular basis."5'
D. So Will It Apply to Accountants?
The key question that emerges from all this, of course, is: Would
the Jaillet rule apply to an accountant providing assurance services
transmitted over the Internet?
An understandable reaction might be that the Jaillet rule, in the
context of accountants' liability, is too good to be true-a reaction
that could become self-fulfilling if the courts feel the same way. Still,
there are some compelling reasons that the Jaillet rule should be just
as applicable to accounting professionals as to other disseminators of
financial information. The core underpinning of the Jaillet rule-that
traditional principles of negligence limit liability to, in the words of
44. Id. at 118 (quoting Torts Restatement, supra note 34, § 552(2) (a)); see also Bily
v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 757-58 (Cal. 1992) (applying Restatement rule
to negligent misrepresentation claim).
45. First Equity Corp., 670 F. Supp. at 118 ("The subscribers and readers of a
newspaper or similar publication hardly constitute a limited class.").
46. Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336-38 (Civ. Ct. 1987).
47. Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898, 901-02 (Ohio 1986).
48. Gale v. Value Line, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 967, 969, 971-72 (D.R.I. 1986).
49. Frst Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 179 (2d Cir.
1989).
50. Gale, 640 F. Supp. at 969 (involving investment advisory newsletter-between
2200 and 4400 subscribers); see also First Equity Corp., 869 F.2d at 176 (involving
loose-leaf summaries of business operations and finances-7500 subscribers); Gutter,
490 N.E.2d at 899 (involving the Wall Street Journal).
51. First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 670 F. Supp. 115, 117 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); see also Gale, 640 F. Supp. at 972 (holding the publisher of Value Line, a publi-
cation that ranks convertible securities and includes purchase recommendations and
warrant evaluations, not liable to a subscriber); Gutter, 490 N.E.2d at 902 (finding the
publisher of the Wall Street Journal not liable to a subscriber).
2000 [Vol. 65
FINANCIAL REPORTING
the Restatement, "a limited group"-is every bit as applicable to ac-
countants as to everybody else. If anything, experience suggests that
the staggering implications for liability are even more of a problem in
the context of accountant liability. And the law has no interest in con-
structing differing standards of liability for accountants and non-ac-
countants, such that the computer-dissemination of financial
information would be left exclusively to those least qualified to do it.
It would be ironic indeed if the imposition of uniquely harsh standards
of liability upon the accounting profession increased its level of expo-
sure, or increased the pricing of its services, to the point where the
computer dissemination of financial information was left exclusively
to nonfinancial journalists.
Nor would the law's interest in truthful information support a dis-
tinction between the function of an accountant and the function of a
non-accountant in assessing the applicability of the principles of Jaillet.
When Dow Jones describes for its subscribers the terms of a corporate
bond, that description carries with it an implicit representation that
Dow Jones has conformed to the standards of its profession in deter-
mining that the information being provided is entirely truthful. An
accountant performing an attest function does in substance the same
thing, though the representation of conformity to professional stan-
dards is typically more than implicit. For example, one case before
the Second Circuit involved loose-leaf summaries "of the business op-
erations and finances of a large number of corporations" wvithout in-
vestment recommendations or any general news.5 If the description
of "business operations and finances" contains a blatant factual error,
it is hard to see why it should be isolated from liability while an ac-
countant making a much more subtle error (testing a reserve for bad
debts, for example) should be held liable. In substance, both the
loose-leaf service and the attest-performing accountant are perform-
ing similar tasks: reporting with ostensible accuracy financial informa-
tion relevant to the instruments of commerce. 3
It is interesting to note, moreover, that some courts have explicitly
stated that the immunization of media-disseminators of information
from negligence claims is entirely consistent with well-established
principles of accountant liability. In declining to permit a negligence
claim against Standard & Poor's for a false description of convertible
securities, for example, the Second Circuit observed that its holding
52. First Equity Corp., 869 F.2d at 176. The court did distinguish a summary of
such information from the actual information itself. Id. at 180.
53. Similarly, it is hard to distinguish, for the purpose of assessing the scope of the
Jaillet rule, between an incorrect financial report that results in an overstated value of
a company's stock, such as a negligent accountant might produce, and an incorrect
description of (say) the terms of convertibility of a bond which results in an overstate-
ment of bond value, a situation in which no liability for negligence has been imposed.




was supported in part by "New York caselaw regarding the liability of
accountants," insofar as the New York Court of Appeals had "care-
fully avoided exposing accountants to liability to a potentially 'inde-
terminate class of persons who, presently or in the future, might...
rel[y]' on a negligently inaccurate audit. '54 The obvious implication is
that, if the principles of law are entirely consistent, when accountants
start disseminating information over computer networks, they should
get the same immunization from negligence as everyone else.55
Almost anyone familiar with the history of accountants' liability,
however, might have a nagging sense that the courts would find some
way to impose liability on accountants to a greater extent than on eve-
ryone else. And anyone stepping back and considering the apparent
distinction between media and non-media mechanisms for disseminat-
ing information might question whether the distinction really makes
sense. It is far from clear, for example, that the class of persons rely-
ing on financial information obtained through an obscure bond news-
letter is that much broader than, say, the class of persons using
EDGAR56 to review a Form 10-K. Nonetheless, for reasons owing
more to history than logic, the latter may give rise to a claim for negli-
gent misrepresentation 57 while the former apparently will not. (To
cloud the issue further, EDGAR is now available on the Internet.)
54. First Equity Corp., 869 F.2d at 179 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 446 (N.Y. 1931)).
55. To anticipate a potential issue, it is not the case that the immunization of a
media-disseminator from a negligence claim is limited to those jurisdictions following
New York's conservative Ultramares rule, which allows only those in privity or those
known to the disseminator to state a negligent misrepresentation claim. See Credit
Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 118 (N.Y. 1985); Ut-
tramares, 174 N.E. at 446. The rationale for the Jaillet rule is conceptually tied more
to the Restatement than to Ultramares, and the Jaillet rule has been applied where the
Ultramares rule has not. See Gutter, 490 N.E.2d at 900-01 (applying Jaillet rule). Inci-
dentally, legal scholars may find interesting that a key New York decision on which
Judge Cardozo based his opinion in Ultramares was the 1920 ticker-service case of
Jaillet. See Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 446.
56. EDGAR is the SEC-owned database which contains the filings of SEC
documents.
57. See Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 323, 332(M.D.N.C. 1995) (stating that whether an auditor owed a duty of care to public mar-
ket investors was a "question of fact"); Grove Holding Corp. v. First Wisconsin Nat'l
Bank, 803 F. Supp. 1486, 1504 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (shareholder stated claim for negli-
gent misrepresentation); Boykin v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 639 So. 2d 504, 510-11(Ala. 1994) (holding that individual shareholders may state a claim for negligence);
Northwest Racquet Swim & Health Clubs, Inc. v. Deloitte & Touche, 535 N.W.2d 612,
619 (Minn. 1995) (allowing a claim for "very specific incidences of misrepresentation
in [an] audit report on which [plaintiff] directly relied"). See generally Wayne Baliga,
Courts Rule in Different Directions on Class Actions Against Accountants, J. Acct.,
Oct. 1996, at 27, 27 (comparing the holding in Specialty Retail Concepts, 908 F. Supp.
323, which found that an accounting firm could be liable to potential investors, to the
holding in Scottish Heritable Trust v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 81 F.3d 606 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 182 (1996), which dismissed a potential investor's claims
against an accounting firm). The existence of these cases permitting a claim is not to
suggest that they are correctly decided. For the reasons discussed above, the doctri-
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A California case illustrates the danger. In Hanberry v. Hearst
Corp. ,58 a woman slipped while wearing new shoes and sued the pub-
lisher of Good Housekeeping magazine because the shoes' soles were
slippery.59 Good Housekeeping was at fault for the woman's injury,
the complaint alleged, because the shoes had been advertised as
"meeting the Good Housekeeping's Consumers' Guaranty Seal,"
which included an assertion that "[w]e satisfy ourselves that products
advertised in Good Housekeeping are good ones and that the adver-
tising claims made for them in our magazine are truthful."'  The seal
itself contained the statement that, "[i]f the product or performance is
defective, Good Housekeeping guarantees replacement or refund to
consumer."61 The woman with slippery shoes alleged that the pub-
lisher (Hearst) had in fact done nothing to investigate the quality of
the shoes, and that the representations to the contrary were deliber-
ately and negligently false.'
The court permitted a claim for both deliberate and negligent mis-
representation. The court was, it conceded, "influenced more by pub-
lic policy than by whether such cause of action can be comfortably
fitted into one of the law's traditional categories of liability."' Im-
plicit in the Good Housekeeping seal of approval, the court said, was
"the representation [that the publisher] has taken reasonable steps to
make an independent examination of the product endorsed, with
some degree of expertise, and found it satisfactory."' Thus, "having
in effect loaned its reputation to promote and induce the sale of a
given product," the court found the publisher should not escape
liability.65
The court's willingness to ignore the principles of Jaillet and uphold
a claim in negligence is disturbing. Even worse, it is easy to see how
the court's language about Good Housekeeping's undertaking an "in-
dependent examination '66 of the product could be turned against the
accounting profession, insofar as the nomenclature of the profession
nally correct view would seem to be that "the liability of auditors and accountants for
negligence or negligent misrepresentation does not exten[d] ... to the general invest-
ing public." Biben v. Card, No. 84-0844-CV-W-6 (W.D. Mo. 1985), quoted in Cammer
v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1298 (D.NJ. 1989); see also Scottish Heritable Trust, 81
F.3d at 613 (accountant owed no duty to an open-market investor); In re Crazy Eddie
Sec. Litig., 812 F. Supp. 338,360 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that an accountant's duty of
care did not extend to "as-yet unidentified future open-market buyers of publicly-
traded securities").
58. 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Ct. App. 1969).










involves an independent examination of financial information. 67 Still,
the case is distinguishable on several grounds, among them that it is
premised on section 311 of the Restatement, which is careful to limit
its applicability to "[o]ne who negligently gives false information" that
results in "physical harm. ' 6 An accountant performing assurance
services, moreover, is not seeking to endorse the purchase of the sub-
ject company's stock or bonds, but to give assurance as to the fairness
of the presentation (be it good or bad) of the financial information at
issue. Additional comfort is in the fact that the cases considering the
analysis of this California court have generally found a way not to
follow it. 69
To summarize, then, as the accounting profession makes the leap
into computer-disseminated financial information, it may qualify
under established principles of law as one who is thereby immunized
from a claim rooted in negligence. The rationale is one steeped in
public policy: a rule to the contrary would foreseeably result in an
exposure to liability that would drive every public-media provider of
information out of business. 70 At the moment there is not, however,
any case so holding in the context of accountant liability. And the
immunization itself would run counter to an intuitive tradition of
broad accountant liability for financial misreporting.
E. The First Amendment
There is an additional measure of protection that may be available
against negligence claims, beyond the long-established protection of
the Jaillet rule. That measure is constitutional: as a disseminator of
information through the means of public media, accountants may be
entitled to First Amendment protection.
Even those who might not be considered traditional media publish-
ers may come under the umbrella of the First Amendment. A pro-
vider of information who gathers data from a variety of sources,
undertakes independent analysis amounting to editorial control over
form and content, and provides this analysis to the general public on a
regular basis may be characterized as a "publisher" for First Amend-
ment purposes.71 Thus, courts have determined that Standard &
67. AICPA, 1 AICPA Professional Standards, at AU § 508.08 (June 1, 1996).
68. Hanberry, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 523 n.1 (quoting Torts Restatement, supra note 34,
§ 311).
69. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 & n.7 (9th Cir.
1991) (distinguishing Hanberry on facts); Yanase v. Automobile Club, 260 Cal. Rptr.
513, 518-19 (Ct. App. 1989) (same).
70. See, e.g., Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898, 901 (Ohio 1986) ("More
importantly, we believe that public poicy ... constraints support protection to news-
papers for a negligent misstatement of fact . . ").
71. See In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 369-70 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
(finding that Standard & Poor's, under the factors cited in the text, qualified for a
journalist's privilege under the First Amendment); Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 520
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Poor's, for example, is entitled to First Amendment protection in con-
nection with its ratings process.2 It may seem something of a stretch
to conclude that CPA-associated financial information should be ac-
corded First Amendment protection when it is disseminated over a
computer network. Of course, in the same vein, it seems something of
a stretch to conclude that Standard & Poor's is entitled to First
Amendment protection in connection with its bond ratings.73
The applicability of First Amendment protection to one who inad-
vertently provides false financial information was illustrated in Daniel
v. Dow Jones & Co.74 That was the case, discussed earlier,75 in which
a law student investor had allegedly relied upon an incorrect report of
a Canadian corporate restructuring provided by the Dow Jones News/
Retrieval Service.76 Although the court disposed of the claim based
N.Y.S.2d 334, 340 (Civ. CL 1987) (holding that the Dow Jones News/Retrieval, an on-
line financial news service, was entitled to "the same [First Amendment] protection as
more established means of news distribution").
72. See In re Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. 577, 581-82 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("The
record allows no other conclusion but that S & P functions as a journalist when gath-
ering information in connection with its ratings process ... with the intent to use the
material to disseminate information to the public...."); In re Scott Paper, 145 F.RID.
at 370 ("[W]hatever the definitional limits of the press for First Amendment purposes,
S & P falls within its umbrella of protection.").
73. It certainly seems something of a stretch to the SEC. In the 1970s and early
1980s, the SEC unsuccessfully sought to require certain newsletter authors to register
as investment advisors. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985). Now, the spurt of
investment information into the Internet, by all appearances, has given the SEC a
whole new set of problems. The early indications are that the SEC will view Internet
disseminators of financial information as potentially less worthy of First Amendment
protection than those who disseminate financial information in print. Thus, a Wall
Street Journal article observed last year:
Once reluctant to impose its antifraud powers on newsletter authors and
other journalists, the SEC is now scrutinizing media mavens of all sorts-and
with greater success than in the past.
The SEC has brought actions recently against an array of people whose
media status once might have protected them, from newsletter editor Ste-
phen Leeb and radio commentator Irwin "Sonny" Bloch to promulgators of
cyberspace communiques on the Internet....
In particular, regulators worry that the proliferation of media activity, in
newsletters and on the Internet, allows people who are bearish on a stock to
grind their axes in print and provide a road map for other bears to sell the
stock as well
Taylor, supra note 20, at C1. Roger Lowenstein notes:
But Kenneth Israel Jr., the SEC's district administrator in Salt Lake City,
says, "Obviously, there is some concern with what is going on over the In-
ternet generally-not to say there is anything illegal going on. This is a new
world for everybody." What should the SEC look at? For starters, is aggres-
sive and possibly manipulative promotion-an activity rightly regulated in
traditional "public" forums-getting a free ride on the info highway?
Lowenstein, supra note 20, at C1.
74. 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Civ. Ct. 1987).
75. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
76. 520 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
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on the Jaillet rule, it went on to observe that Dow Jones's report of the
restructuring was entitled to "the fullest protection of the First
Amendment. ' '7 7  Services such as Dow Jones's computerized
database, the court explained, "are instruments for the free flow of all
forms of information, and should be treated as unquestionably within
the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press. '78
Lest anyone get too carried away with this, the level of First
Amendment protection accorded to disseminators of financial infor-
mation is a matter of substantial uncertainty and dispute. In a
Supreme Court case, for example, the extent to which Dun & Brad-
street was entitled to First Amendment protection in connection with
a false credit report sent to five subscribers resulted in a fractured
Court (a plurality opinion of three, two separate concurrences, and
four united in dissent), and to this day it is unclear what the Court's
decision actually means.79
Whatever the case, as a practical matter, the existence of First
Amendment protection may not add much to the protections already
provided by the Jaillet rule. The First Amendment generally acts as a
shield from liability in the absence of "actual malice"-knowledge
that the statement is false or reckless disregard as to its truth.80 The
Jaillet rule already provides such protection, insofar as it does not per-
mit liability for a claim of mere negligence. But, if nothing else, the
potential applicability of First Amendment protections may help keep
pro-liability courts in line.
77. Id at 340.
78. Id
79. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 750, 762-63
(1985); see In re Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. 577, 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (distin-
guishing Greenmoss and observing that the Greenmoss opinion had explicitly noted
that "[t]he protection to be accorded a particular credit report depends on whether
the report's content, form, and context indicate that it concerns a public matter"
(quoting Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 762 n.8)).
The level of First Amendment protection applicable to a provider of financial infor-
mation was recently thrown into more uncertainty by events occurring in the wake of
the Orange County bankruptcy. Five months ago, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Central District of California denied Standard & Poor's motion to dis-
miss the county's suit against it, holding that the First Amendment does not protect it
from a $500 million lawsuit brought by Orange County. County of Orange v. Mc-
Graw-Hill Cos., 203 B.R. 983 (C.D. Cal. 1996). The bankruptcy court found S & P's
argument that it was entitled to First Amendment protection to be "off target," be-
cause Orange County had complained that S & P had failed to fulfill its contractual
obligations with the county in connection with a number of bond issues the county
was considering, rather than asserting any claim relating to S & P's published ratings.
Id. at 990.
80. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding
in the defamation-of-a-public-official context that "[t]he constitutional guarantees re-
quire, we think, a federal rule that prohibits ... recover[y] ... unless ... the statement
was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not").
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F. The Use of Disclaimers
In the event that a court should decline to extend the Jaillet rule to
CPA-associated financial information disseminated over the Internet,
and that First Amendment protections are found to be inapplicable,
there remains a third level of protection from liability. Accountants
should have the same legal right to do what Moody's, Dow Jones, and
other computer-based providers of financial information do: limit re-
sponsibility as a matter of disclaimer. In the context of information
provided over a computer network, there are two potential opportuni-
ties: (1) in a subscription agreement, if one is to be entered; and (2) as
part of the "on-line" sign-up procedures at the outset of a
transmission.8'
Indeed, it is common for those providing financial information over
the Internet to include in the transmission some form of disclaimer.
Moody's, for example, begins its transmission with a full page entitled
"Copyright," including assertions that: (1) the information is copy-
righted; (2) the information may not be copied, reproduced, or other-
wise disseminated without prior written consent; (3) Moody's believes
its sources of information to be accurate and reliable, but the informa-
tion is provided "without warranty of any kind"; (4) Moody's shall not
be liable for "any loss or damage in whole or in part" in connection
with the information; (5) Moody's is only giving "statements of opin-
ion and not statements of fact or recommendations"; and (6) Moody's
is being paid by the issuers of the debt securities it is rating.Y2
From the perspective of risk management, the inclusion of such dis-
claimers is a sound idea. A prohibition against reproduction, for ex-
ample, may pose a constraint upon those to whom the information
may be given and, thereby, upon those who may obtain legal redress
for its inaccuracy.83 More broadly, absent violations of public policy
or express statutory rules,84 courts will generally honor and enforce
commercial relationships as the parties have expressly defined them.
Either a subscription agreement, if there is to be one, or a computer
sign-up procedure gives the accounting profession an important op-
portunity to set forth precisely the limits on its responsibilities. It can
also place a limitation upon liability should those responsibilities inad-
vertently not be fulfilled.
81. See Daniel, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 337 n.1.
82. Moody's Investors Service (visited Nov. 1996) <httpJ/www.moodys.com
mdycpyrt.htm>.
83. See Strong v. Retail Credit Co., 552 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976)
("[Plaintiff] must still establish that she was entitled to rely upon those misrepresenta-
tions.... One who makes a misrepresentation is not liable to those persons whom he
has no purpose to reach or influence and when there is no special reason to expect
that the misrepresentation will influence such persons.").
84. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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The potential significance of such language was illustrated by a
Rhode Island district court in a case against Value Line. In Gale v.
Value Line, Inc., 5 a Value Line subscriber read a description of war-
rants that did not accurately describe the warrants' terms.8 6 He sued
Value Line for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation.87
In defense, Value Line pointed to the front page of each issue, which
disclaimed that "[fjactual material is obtained from sources believed
to be reliable but cannot be guaranteed." Value Line contended
that the disclaimer precluded liability.
The court gave every indication that the terms of the disclaimer
would determine Value Line's responsibility.8 9 Unfortunately for
Value Line, the court in that particular case found that Value Line's
disclaimer was not very effective-it only protected Value Line from
errors by others, not from errors by itself.90 The court stated: "Had
the defendant wished to protect itself from its own errors as occurred
in this instance, it could have said it so much more clearly, for exam-
ple: 'The publisher is not responsible for any errors or omissions. ''91
Even with this poor drafting, though, the court did not find Value
Line liable, because Value Line-under the terms of the agreement-
had not assumed responsibility for complete accuracy to start with.92
The court stated:
Plaintiff has pointed to no language in any of the solicitations by
defendant for subscriptions under which defendant assumes the re-
sponsibility of 100% accuracy. There is no assurance or guarantee
that the publisher, among the myriad of detail to be reported, will
not somehow make a mistake as occurred in this instance....
In short, there is no express[ ] contract to be breached as a basis
for the plaintiff[']s action. Nor is there any implied agreement.
Plaintiff can point to no circumstances which impose a particular
duty upon the defendant as a matter of law, hence no implied con-
tractual remedy is available to plaintiff.93
The usefulness of express language to limit responsibility and dam-
ages, however, is subject to important qualifications. First, contractual
exemption from liability for intentional or reckless misconduct may be
85. 640 F. Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 1986).
86. Id. at 969-70.
87. Id. at 970.
88. Id.
89. Id. By noting that the disclaimer was "not adequate," the court intimated that




93. Id.; see also Fidelity Leasing Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 786,
788 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (exculpatory clause in subscription agreement with Dun & Brad-
street is "valid and enforceable"); Hong Kong Export Credit Ins. Corp. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 414 F. Supp. 153, 157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same).
[Vol. 652008
FINANCIAL REPORTING
unenforceable on grounds of public policy.94 Second, contractual ex-
emption from liability for even negligent misconduct may be unen-
forceable on grounds of public policy under particular circumstances
as defined by state law, such as where an employer seeks to exempt
itself from liability for an employee's injury, one of the parties is part
of a protected class, or the agreement seeks to exempt one charged
with a duty of public service from liability to one to whom the duty is
owed.9' Third, aspects of disclaimers may not be effective because of
peculiarities imbedded in the law of a particular state. For example,
because of the peculiar way that California defines fraud, a contract
which exempts a party from liability for even negligent misrepresenta-
tion is potentially "void as against the policy" of California.16 A Mas-
sachusetts case, though somewhat ambiguous, raises the possibility
that Massachusetts law may provide the same result.97
Any undertaking to draft such disclaimer language, therefore, need
be done with care and keen sensitivity to the requirements of state
law. As a general proposition, though, such disclaimers will be
enforced.
G. Claims Premised on Fraud
The above will prove less effective when it comes to protecting an
accountant from a claim based on fraud. The Jaillet rule precludes
only claims based on negligence.98 The First Amendment does not
protect deliberate falsehoods. 99 And a disclaimer, while potentially
limiting exposure from negligent misstatements, may be less effective
where the accountant has deliberately lied.100
It is not the case, therefore, that the use of a computer network to
disseminate financial information will make an accountant completely
impervious to legal liability where a fraud claim can be stated. None-
theless, a fraud claim will normally be much more difficult to sustain
94. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195(1) (1981). But see Torts Restate-
ment, supra note 34, § 496B (providing for express assumption of risk).
95. Restatement of Contracts, supra note 94, § 195(2).
96. Blankenheim v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 593, 599 (Ct. App. 1990).
97. See Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461,465 (1st Cir. 1985). The ambi-
guity regarding a claim for negligent misrepresentation stems from the court's decla-
ration that it is "clearly against [Massachusetts] public policy" to allow one to disclaim
for "its own misrepresentations," accompanied by its observation that "Massachusetts
[law] has permitted individuals to contractually disclaim liability for mere negligence"
if "the disclaimer has been clear and unambiguous to that effect." Id.; see also Bouvier
Bros., Inc. v. Baker Protective Servs., No. 93421, 1994 WL 879634, at *3 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Apr. 15, 1994) (finding that exculpatory clause protected alarm service company
from liability for negligent misrepresentations).
98. See supra parts I.C-D.
99. See supra part I.E.
100. See supra part I.F. On the other hand, to the extent a disclaimer may preclude




and prove than a claim for negligence. Further, if the relationship is
structured whereby the professional is paid by the subscriber, rather
than by the company on whose financial information the professional
is attesting, the plausibility of a fraud claim would seem to be seriously
diminished. 1 1 In most of the reported cases against the conventional
providers of financial information-such as Dow Jones, Standard &
Poor's, Value Line, etc.-it does not appear that a fraud claim is gen-
erally even alleged. Dismissal of the negligence claim thus results in a
termination of the litigation. 0 2
II. MOVING FROM TORT TO CoNTRAcr THEORIES OF LIABILITY
A. The Increasing Availability of Contract Theories
Thcked away in the shift to computer-disseminated financial infor-
mation is an important change that, instead of posing new risks, may
present an opportunity to reduce old ones. The opportunity grows out
of a key difference between transmission by paper and transmission
by computer.
One characteristic of transmission by paper is that, once the finan-
cial information has been delivered (typically to the reporting entity),
the professional has completely lost control. From that point on, the
information can be made available to virtually anyone; and virtually
anyone is free to use it, misuse it, or not use it at all, but still to com-
mence a lawsuit if the information turns out to be wrong. Such a law-
suit, once commenced, need not always meet its deserved fate. As a
practical matter, the only constraints upon recovery may be the com-
mon sense of the jury and the persuasiveness of counsel.
Information transmitted by a computer network is different. The
professional can target the audience, disclaim certain uses,10 3 or condi-
tion access upon a willingness to accept specified terms and condi-
tions. Most important, the professional and the user may also,
through a subscription agreement, enter a contract. Even without a
written subscription agreement, a user can "sign" a contract electroni-
cally by computer. °4
101. The basic theme of virtually any fraud claim against an accountant is that the
accountant knuckled under to its client and issued a false report on misstated financial
information. To the extent the "client" is the user of the financial information, that
underlying theme is substantially dissipated. Though the precise configuration of
these relationships is yet to be established by the profession, the Elliott Committee
Report includes as an entirely foreseeable, if not likely, relationship one in which the
professional is paid by the user. See Elliott Committee Report, supra note 9, at <http:/
/www.aicpa.orglassurance/scas/comstud/effectlconstr.htm>.
102. See, e.g., First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 670 F. Supp. 115
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989); Gale v. Value Line, Inc., 640 F.
Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 1986); Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Civ. Ct. 1987).
103. See supra part I.F.
104. The legal implications of computer "signatures" are being explored in a variety
of contexts. See David Bank, Social Security, Pitney Bowes to Test Filing of W-2 Forms
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For risk management, one implication stands above all others. The
profession, as the systems of financial reporting shift from paper to
computer, may have the historic opportunity to change the avenues of
professional liability from those rooted in tort to those rooted in con-
tract. That opportunity, moreover, may be furthered by another shift.
The focus of financial information is moving from the desires of the
reporting entity to the needs of users, particularly as key groups of
financial information users-such as analysts and institutional inves-
tors-become increasingly powerful by way of an aging population
that is accumulating wealth. °5 Even less-significant users, through
the conveyance of their combined desires by the workings of the mar-
ket, can create a force to be reckoned with. The net result may be an
increased opportunity to define liability in contract and users with the
economic power to constitute someone with whom the professional
can bargain.
It is not necessarily the case, therefore, that the profession's historic
exposure to liability in tort need continue unabated. To a significant
extent, it can be controlled by shifting to liability in contract. One
consequence, though, is that the profession must come to grips with a
question that it has never before had the luxury to ask. Given the
opportunity to choose between liability in tort and liability in contract,
which theory of liability-tort or contract-does the profession actu-
ally prefer? 10 6
B. Liability Rooted in Contract
Conceptually, the choice should not make a big difference. The end
result of a professional impropriety, whether pursued in tort or in con-
on the Internet, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1996, at A9C ("The project will also test critical
elements of electronic commerce on the World Wide Web, including the validity of
digital 'signatures,' which haven't yet been accepted as legal by the agency.").
105. It is an important theme of both the Jenkins Committee and the Elliott Com-
mittee reports that financial statements be reconfigured to better accommodate the
needs of users rather than the desires of reporting entities. See Elliott Committee
Report, supra note 9, at <http://www.aicpa.org/assurance/scas/majtheme/focusfm-
dex.htm>; Jenkins Committee Report, supra note 2, at 4.
106. Interests of economic efficiency plainly seem to favor a shift from tort to con-
tract theories of liability. The reason is that precisely-defined responsibilities and
remedies-the sort found in a negotiated contract, but utterly lacking in a relationship
defined by tort-allow for an allocation of resources precisely consistent with the eco-
nomic interests of those concerned. It has even been suggested that an underlying
rationale to Judge Cardozo's opinion in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441
(N.Y. 1931), involved "the advantages of using private ordering as a supplemental
means of allocating risk." John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of
Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1929, 1941 (1988). See generally Victor P.
Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. Legal
Stud. 295 (1988) (criticizing the expansion of third-party liability as to accountants
and discussing the merits of the Ultramares doctrine); Siliciano, supra, at 1957-58
("For most third parties, then, tort law might sensibly view private ordering as a via-
ble alternative to a foreseeability-based negligence rule.").
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tract, should be the same: the professional must remedy the harm
caused, normally by paying money. Nonetheless, tort theories of lia-
bility have historically been preferred by plaintiffs and have, not coin-
cidentally, generally resulted in the largest verdicts and settlements.
The principal reasons are that tort theories, speaking very generally,
allow a broader group to sue and, in some instances, to collect more
money than under contract.
At a conceptual level, the substitution of liability in contract for lia-
bility in tort would therefore permit the professional some ability to
control its exposure to risk. In the United States, two parties have the
commercial freedom, with certain exceptions, to establish in contract
whatever terms upon which they can agree.107 If a professional and
his or her client want to agree to limit those who may sue, the dam-
ages to be recovered, or other aspects of their business relationship,
they can do that. 08 An important exception precludes them from
agreeing to things that would violate public policy, 10 9 but the funda-
mental freedom to agree on things is generally given fair latitude." 0
A starting point for consideration of a preferred system of profes-
sional liability, therefore, is to evaluate the merits of a system that
substitutes contract theories for those in tort. That is not to say that
the substitution of contract for tort is without disadvantages: under a
contract theory you need not demonstrate scienter or even negligence,
as you typically must to prove a tort, and the statute of limitations
may be longer in contract than in tort, to give just two important ex-
amples. Still, a liability system premised in contract may offer poten-
tial advantages over one premised in tort.
107. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (referring to "an-
cient concepts of freedom of contract"); Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d 821, 824
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) ("[T]here is ordinarily no public policy which prevents the
parties from contracting as they see fit .... "); Torts Restatement, supra note 34,
§ 496B cmt. b (freedom to contract in the assumption-of-risk context); W. Page Kee-
ton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68, at 482 (5th ed. 1984) [herein-
after Prosser on Torts] ("There is in the ordinary case no public policy which prevents
the parties from contracting as they see fit .... ").
108. Torts Restatement, supra note 34, § 496B cmt. b ("There is no general policy
of the law which prevents the parties from agreeing that the defendant shall be under
no such general or specific duty to the plaintiff."); Prosser on Torts, supra note 107,
§ 68, at 482 ("It is quite possible for the parties expressly to agree in advance that the
defendant is under no obligation of care for the benefit of the plaintiff, and shall not
be liable for the consequences of conduct which would otherwise be negligent."). But
see FDIC v. Schoenberger, 781 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (E.D. La. 1992) (holding that a
professional's breach of duty constitutes a tort, and that a professional could not
avoid liability by having contracted not to be liable for negligence).
109. See generally Torts Restatement, supra note 34, § 496B (stating that an agree-
ment limiting a defendant's liability is valid "unless the agreement is invalid as con-
trary to public policy"); Prosser on Torts, supra note 107, § 68, at 482-83.
110. An important exception to the freedom of parties to contract as they desire
limits the ability of agreements to exculpate one of the parties from willful, wanton,
reckless, or gross misconduct or conduct that constitutes an intentional tort. See Pros-
ser on Torts, supra note 107, § 68, at 484.
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At this point, the discussion must become more precise. First, as to
the distinction between tort and contract, there is no entirely satisfac-
tory definition of a "tort," but for this purpose we can use the gener-
ally unsatisfactory definition of "a civil wrong, other than breach of
contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an
action for damages.""' As a practical matter, most accountant liabil-
ity torts involve some form of misrepresentation, either fraud or negli-
gent misrepresentation. A contract theory of liability, in contrast,
generally refers to a theory pursuant to which a court will seek to
remedy a civil wrong based upon breach of an explicit or implied
agreement between the parties.
With these definitions in mind, it is useful to isolate those aspects of
tort liability that historically have proved most economically ineffi-
cient, and assess the extent to which economic efficiency can be en-
hanced through contract. There are at least nine such issues:
* Who may sue;
• The content of the professional statement;
* The professional's level of culpability;
• Proximate cause;
* Damages;
" The statute of limitations;
" Contributory and comparative negligence;
" Third-party practice; and
* The cost of litigation.
Each is discussed in turn.
C. Who May Sue?
The issue of those who may sue an accountant has plagued the pro-
fession for more than a half-century." 2 It was this issue that Judge
Cardozo was addressing when he uttered his prescient phrase that lia-
bility in negligence (a tort) would result in a mechanism by which "a
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery be-
neath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a lia-
bility in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class." 1
13
Today, that phrase comes close to describing the exposure of the
profession in some jurisdictions. The basic problem is that, under
traditional tort principles, the world of potential litigants is limited
only by those who are "foreseeable.""' 4 In the context of personal
injury, in which the concept of foreseeability has its historical roots,
111. Id § 1, at 2.
112. See Siliciano, supra note 106, at 1933-41 (tracing the history of the privity issue
in accountant liability cases from 1931 to 1988).
113. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
114. Prosser on Torts, supra note 107, § 43, at 280.
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this makes some sense, insofar as, for example, the universe of fore-
seeable people who may slip on a patch of ice and injure themselves is
fairly ascertainable and discrete." 5 In the context of financial infor-
mation, in contrast, the world of foreseeable litigants is almost without
limit. In the context of financial information, you can "foresee" just
about anything." 6
The courts have struggled with this issue at length-this is the so-
called "privity" issue that is such a common topic within the profes-
sion. Basically, three rules have emerged. The most favorable for the
profession is the "Ultramares"' 7 or (more recently) "Credit Alli-
ance"" 8 rule, pursuant to which only a "known" party who was in-
tended by the professional to rely on the information may allege a
claim for negligence. At the other end of the spectrum, some jurisdic-
tions have hung on to the "foreseeability" rule, pursuant to which any
person whose use of financial information was reasonably foreseeable
may allege a claim." 9 In the middle is the so-called "Restatement"
rule. 20 Under that rule, claims against the professional are limited to
"the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance [the professional] intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it.' 2 1
The last decade has witnessed a notable shift away from the "fore-
seeability" rule in the direction of either the Credit Alliance rule or,
115. See Siliciano, supra note 106, at 1943 ("[T]he laws of physics generally limit the
degree of physical harm caused by a tortious act."); cf. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 445
("In either view, however, what is released or set in motion is a physical force. We are
now asked to say that a like liability attaches to the circulation of a thought or a
release of the explosive power resident in words.").
116. The shortcomings of foreseeability as a useful concept to limit damages in the
context of financial information were outlined by the California Supreme Court in
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992). The court stated:
[F]oreseeability ... is endless because [it], like light, travels indefinitely in a
vacuum.... [It] proves too much.... Although it may set tolerable limits
for most types of physical harm, it provides virtually no limit on liability for
nonphysical harm.... It is apparent that reliance on foreseeability of injury
alone in finding a duty, and thus a right to recover, is not adequate when the
damages sought are for an intangible injury.
Id. at 762 (quoting Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 659, 663-64 (1989)) (alterations
in original).
117. See Ultramares, 174 N.E. 441.
118. See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 118-19
(N.Y. 1985) (reaffirming the Ultramares rule in New York).
119. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315,
318-23 (Miss. 1987) (considering both the UltramareslCredit Alliance and the Torts
Restatement rules and rejecting both, approving instead a "reasonably foreseeable"
rule, but also noting that "the auditor remains free to limit the dissemination of his
opinion through a separate agreement with the audited entity"); Citizens State Bank
v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
120. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 747, 767-74 (adopting the Torts Restatement rule for
identifying prospective plaintiffs in negligent misrepresentation cases, but following
the Ultramares rule for general negligence cases).
121. Torts Restatement, supra note 34, § 552.
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more frequently, the Restatement rule.12 At present, only two states
apply the foreseeability rule to claims of negligence: Mississippi and
Wisconsin. 123 Until recently, a third state-New Jersey-followed the
foreseeability rule as established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler."4 Two years ago, Rosenblum, and the
foreseeability rule in New Jersey, were unceremoniously dumped by
the legislature."
Still, the foreseeability rule is alive and well in several other con-
texts. Most notably, those states by which it has been abandoned have
only abandoned it as to claims for negligence. It still applies to claims
for fraud.12
6
One of the biggest benefits of substituting contract-based liability
for that of tort is the potential for elimination of the foreseeability
rule and, for that matter, the Restatement rule-at least in the ab-
sence of the professional's explicit knowledge and consent. Under a
contract-based system, the issue of those who may rely upon the pro-
fessional's work would ideally become, in the context of an engage-
ment or ongoing relationship, a focused-upon matter of agreement.
To the extent a widespread audience was desired, the professional
could reach agreement or agreements to that effect. Where a limited
audience was the goal, the range of the audience could be appropri-
ately narrowed, with access by others precluded by use of a subscrip-
tion agreement, electronic limitation to access, warnings given as part
of the sign-on procedure, or by all three.' 27 Economic efficiency
122. See, eg., Bily, 834 P.2d 745; NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2Ai53A-25 (West Supp. 1996).
123. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d at 318-23; Citizens State Bank, 335
N.W.2d at 365-67.
124. 461 A.2d 138 (NJ. 1983).
125. See NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-25.
126. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (N.Y. 1931). The UI-
tramares court held:
Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the consequences of
fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so negligent as to
justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its adequacy, for this again
is fraud. It does no more than say that, if less than this is proved, if there has
been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere profession of an opinion,
but only honest blunder, the ensuing liability for negligence is one that is
bounded by the contract, and is to be enforced between the parties by whom
the contract has been made.
Id; see Denzil Y. Causey, Jr. & Sandra A. Causey, Duties and Liabilities of Public
Accountants 5-7 (5th ed. 1995 & Interim Supp. May 1996) ("Some courts hold that
auditors are liable for fraud to foreseeable users of their reports since such uses
should have been contemplated.").
127. To the extent access or justifiable reliance can be precluded either through
electronic means or disclaimers, non-contractual but foreseeable users may thereby
be prevented from recovery even on claims of fraud. See Union Bank v. Ernst &
Whinney, 278 Cal. Rptr. 490, 499 (Ct. App. 1991) ("In this case, E & Y specifically
disclaimed the type of reliance the Bank now argues that it placed on the review
report. ... Under these circumstances, it is inherently unreasonable for the Bank, as
an experienced user of financial statements, to rely on the E & Y review report as an
assurance that Z Best was financially sound."); Strong v. Retail Credit Co., 552 P.2d
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would be enhanced, insofar as the professional could assess the risk
associated with the engagement in the context of engagement plan-
ning and terms.128
It may be that, under a contract-based system, the professional in
many engagements would end up no differently than he would under,
say, a foreseeability rule, only now as a matter of agreement. The
point is that the professional would have the opportunity to address
the issue as a threshold matter, assess the risk, and ensure that the risk
was reflected in the terms of the engagement. This is one area that
plainly favors contract theories over tort theories of liability.
D. The Content of the Professional Statement
The issue here is the extent to which the professional can control
the risk of a misunderstanding of the professional's role as well as a
misunderstanding of the substantive content of the professional's re-
port or other communication.
This issue involves what is commonly referred to as the "expecta-
tion gap": the gap between the perception of the professional's re-
sponsibility and the professional's responsibility in fact.129
Historically, a principal cause of the expectation gap has been some
lack of sophistication on the part of users of financial information,
who have failed to understand the professional's limited role and the
limited assurance that the professional was providing. The liability
problem was frequently exacerbated by the fact that, in a litigation,
the finder of fact might not understand the limited role of the profes-
sional either.
This problem may always be with the profession, but it may be miti-
gated where liability is based in contract. The reason is that contrac-
tual identification of the end users of the financial information permits
the professional to understand the audience, assess its level of sophis-
1025, 1028 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) ("[Plaintiff] must still establish that she was entitled
to rely upon those misrepresentations.... One who makes a misrepresentation is not
liable to those persons whom he has no purpose to reach or influence and when there
is no special reason to expect that the misrepresentation will influence such per-
sons."); Evans v. Israeloff, Trattner & Co., 617 N.Y.S.2d 899, 900 (App. Div. 1994)("Evans has not shown justifiable reliance on alleged misrepresentations made by the
defendants in the compilations in making his investment decisions.").
128. See Goldberg, supra note 106, at 296 ("If the parties want assurance, they can
expressly contract for it.").
129. The "expectation gap" in the accounting profession has been the focus of con-
siderable attention. See Robert S. Kay & D. Gerald Searfoss, Handbook of Account-
ing and Auditing 45-24 (2d ed. 1989); Michael R. Young, The Liability of Corporate
Officials to Their Outside Auditor for Financial Statement Fraud, 64 Fordham L. Rev.
2155, 2159 (1996); Eric R. Dinallo, Note, The Peculiar Treatment of Contributory Neg-
ligence in Accountants' Liability Cases, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 329, 332 (1990) ("Account-
ants even have coined a term-'expectation gap'-to describe the difference between
the responsibilities auditors believe they assume in conducting an audit, and what the
public and the courts perceive such an undertaking to entail.").
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tication, and, within the bounds of professional standards, modify the
substance of the professional's communication accordingly. Contrac-
tual identification of the users also permits the professional to pre-
clude dissemination to those whose lack of sophistication creates the
greatest risk of a misunderstanding.
The practical operation of a contract in this context is illustrated by
an exposure draft published by the AICPA on the Assembly of Finan-
cial Statements for Internal Use Only.130 Unlike a standard audit re-
port in its present form, the exposure draft contemplated limited
circulation of the information, thereby giving the accounting profes-
sional the opportunity in a way otherwise unavailable to tailor the
level of assurance to the particular audience. The proposed engage-
ment letter thus contemplated written acknowledgment, within the
terms of the engagement itself, that the financial statements "may
contain departures from generally accepted accounting principles" but
that the user might still find them useful insofar as the user had
"knowledge of the business' day-to-day affairs that will allow you to
place that information in the proper context."' 3' The engagement let-
ter went on to limit distribution of the financial statements "to those
internal persons with similar knowledge.' '1 32
The risk of some unintended, unsophisticated user being able to
claim a lack of understanding of the professional's role or level of as-
surance is thereby reduced.
E. The Professional's Level of Culpability
If consideration of the first two issues favors claims based on con-
tract, consideration of this third issue does not. The third issue in-
volves the extent to which the professional must possess some level of
culpability in connection with a failure to perform.
In tort, some level of culpability must generally be established. To
prove fraud, one must prove an intent to make a false statement or, in
some cases, recklessness in doing so.' 33 To demonstrate negligence,
neither intentional nor reckless misconduct is required; but a failure to
conform to a reasonable standard of care must still be shown.13'
None of that is required to prove a claim based on breach of con-
tract. In the context of a contract claim, the issue is: did the profes-
sional perform in accordance with the contract's terms? If the
130. AICPA, Proposed Statement on Standards for Accounting and Review Ser-
vices: Assembly of Financial Statements for Internal Use Only (Exposure draft Sept.
6, 1995).
131. Id- at app. A.
132. Id.
133. See Prosser on Torts, supra note 107, § 107, at 740-42. The significance of the
Supreme Court's decision more than twenty years ago in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976), is that it established the prerequisite of scienter for claims
pursuant to section 10(b).
134. See Prosser on Torts, supra note 107, § 32, at 173-74.
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professional did not, the purest motives and the most vigorous effort
will not excuse the professional from liability.'35 If there has been a
breach, the professional will be liable, and will be called upon to rem-
edy the breach through the payment of damages.
While the disparity seems significant in the abstract, however, as a
practical matter it is much less so. The reason is that, given the nature
of financial information and the professional's role, in all likelihood an
agreement will rarely seek to make the professional a guarantor of
accuracy, the result being that some standard of professional culpabil-
ity is likely to be drafted into a normal agreement. That standard of
culpability, in all likelihood, would involve a failure to adhere to pro-
fessional standards-precisely the same standard that applies to tort
claims for negligence. Moreover, to the extent a different standard of
culpability were desired, it would become the subject of negotiation
and agreement, and the professional would be placed on notice
thereby. If the professional were prepared to guarantee the accuracy
of the financial information at issue, that would be the standard
against which his performance would be measured, and the terms of
the engagement could be adjusted accordingly.
Although consideration of the professional's culpability suggests, in
the first instance, the preferability of claims based in tort, the practical
answer, therefore, is less clear. One caveat should be kept in mind. In
a contract-based relationship, it is likely that a professional would be
liable at least for any failure to conform to professional standards.
Substitution of contract liability for liability in tort may thus eliminate
a tort defense based upon a lack of scienter, which is presently re-
quired, as mentioned above, to prove fraud.
F. Proximate Cause
The concept of "proximate cause" is a principle of common law
which, in the context of financial information, addresses the level of
scrutiny and degree of reliance a user must establish as a predicate to
a recovery for any harm caused thereby.136 The common articulation
is that the user must establish "justifiable reliance" upon the financial
information in order to state a tort claim.' 37
135. Cf Holland v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 469 N.E.2d 419, 429 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984) ("Andersen contracted with ARC for a specific result, namely, disclosing any
known irregularities, and breached that contract when it failed to provide that prom-
ised result."). See generally 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 707, at 327-
28 (1960) ("The cause of a contractor's breach of his contract is seldom, if ever, mate-
rial in determining whether or not his incomplete performance deserves to be de-
scribed as 'substantial."').
136. See generally Prosser on Torts, supra note 107, § 108, at 749-50.
137. Eldred v. McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen, 468 N.W.2d 218, 219-20 (Iowa
1991) ("While privity is not required, all three of plaintiffs' misrepresentation theories
require that the plaintiffs justifiably rely to their detriment on some misrepresenta-
tion."); see also Causey, Jr. & Causey, supra note 126, at 194-97 (analyzing issue of
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Exactly what a showing of "justifiable reliance" requires is a matter
of almost endless dispute, and one of the most frustrating issues that a
professional will typically encounter arising out of tort claims. 13 At
one end of the spectrum, courts will interpret the prerequisite of justi-
fiable reliance to require affirmative proof that the user has read the
financial information, studied it, understood it, and acted sensibly as a
result thereof.139 At the other end of the spectrum, some courts will
permit purported users of financial information to claim "justifiable
reliance" on financial information they have never even seen. 14 In
reliance in accountant liability cases); Prosser on Torts, supra note 107, § 108, at 749
("Not only must there be reliance but the reliance must be justifiable under the
circumstances.").
138. The underlying problem is that
[o]bviously, a third party who suffers harm when an audited client becomes
insolvent has a strong incentive, ex post, to feign or exaggerate its reliance on
the audit in an effort to recover losses from the accountant. Such claims are
particularly difficult to test in the adjudicative process because they often
consist of nothing more than the third party's oral representation that it re-
lied on the audit rather than other factors in deciding to deal with the client.
Siliciano, supra note 106, at 1947. See generally Prosser on Torts, supra note 107,
§ 108, at 749 ("There has been a vast amount of misunderstanding regarding the basis
for the requirement of justifiability of reliance. .. ").
139. See, e.g., Smolen v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1990)(finding that, to avoid summary judgment, "[a]ppellants must present some evidence
establishing the element of causation, in the sense of actual and justifiable reliance");
Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1127, 1143 (D. Kan. 1992); In re Wyse Tech. Sec. Litig.,
744 F. Supp. 207, 210 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (dismissing plaintiffs' claim because "plaintiffs
have not alleged that they received and relied on the financial statements prepared by
Arthur Young"); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Ruwart, 114 B.R. 725, 728-29 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1990) ("[T]here is little evidence that either creditor actually relied on the fi-
nancial information contained in the statements.... [T]he creditor must demonstrate
actual and reasonable reliance as to the false statements."); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F.
Supp. 1264,1297-98 (D.NJ. 1989) (claims of fraud and deceit dismissed as to plaintiffs
who could not allege direct reliance on audit report); Stratton v. Sacks, 99 B.R 686,
696 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989) ("Plaintiff has not in this case been able to point to evi-
dence in the record showing that there is a reasonable probability or reasonable cer-
tainty that the acts complained of caused the losses suffered."), aff'd, 900 F.2d 255
(4th Cir. 1990); E.F. Hutton Mortgage Corp. v. Pappas, 690 F. Supp. 1465, 1475 (D.
Md. 1988) ("Hutton as a sophisticated business entity can hardly claim losses alleg-
edly resulting from its reliance on the audit reports when ordinary diligence on its
part would have caused it to stop buying mortgage loans ... ."); Stagen v. Stewart-
West Coast Title Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 732, 735 (Ct. App. 1983); CapeU Assocs., Inc. v.
Central Valley Sec. Co., 67 Cal. Rptr. 463,468 (Ct. App. 1968); McGregor v. Wright, 3
P.2d 624,627 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Bank of St. Helena v. Lilienthal-Brayton Co.,
264 P. 546, 548 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928) (no justifiable reliance on financial informa-
tion in a circular merely because "a copy of this circular was in possession of the
bank"); Eldred v. McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen, 468 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa
1991) ("We hold that this sort of vicarious reliance is too weak to support a finding of
tortious misrepresentation."); Delmar Vineyard v. Timmons, 486 S.W.2d 914, 919
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) ("In the absence of any showing the complainants relied upon
the defendants' audit, it becomes impossible to show complainants' damages were a
direct consequence of defendants' negligence or breach of contract.").
140. See Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976) (accountant's alleged rep-
resentation made to state insurance commissioner rather than to plaintiff); Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Castellett, No. 92-4635 (D.N.J. 1994) ("Because Colonial and federal
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the context of failed savings & loan and bank litigation, for example,
the FDIC and the RTC would allege "justifiable reliance" by lending
institutions whether the lending institutions had seen the financial in-
formation or not.141 In the context of efficient public securities mar-
kets, justifiable reliance frequently may now be presumed.142
Contract-based theories to some extent can limit hypothetical
claims of justifiable reliance. The terms of an agreement can, for ex-
ample, either explicitly or implicitly establish the manner in which the
financial information is to be used. If the terms of the engagement
make clear that the financial information is to be used in a particular
way or for a particular business purpose, a failure to use the informa-
tion in the specified manner may make a contention of proximate
cause difficult. At a minimum, such contractual terms may call into
question uncorroborated testimony that the financial information was
effectively used in a way not contemplated by the written agreement.
G. Damages
There is a definite advantage to the use of contract theories of lia-
bility when it comes to the issue of damages.
The benefit arises from the fundamental ability of the parties,
within certain limits, to agree to whatever they want. This means that,
at the time the engagement is agreed upon, the parties can address as
a threshold matter the consequence of any breach and the extent to
which the professional will be responsible in damages therefor.
The possibilities are limited only by public policy and the negotiat-
ing strengths of the parties. Possible remedies for a breach of the pro-
fessional engagement might theoretically include: (1) no damages, but
merely corrective performance; (2) a return of the professional fee;
(3) liquidated damages of a specified amount (to the extent permitted
by law); (4) out-of-pocket loss; (5) lost profits; or (6) anything re-
motely foreseeable. In all instances, the parties would be free contrac-
tually to seek to eliminate any prospect of punitive damages, thus
potentially reducing that risk from the professional engagement. 43
The parties might even agree to the "English rule" of fee shifting,
regulators relied on the financial statements in the course of a proper business pur-
pose, they were foreseeable users of the information, and BDO could be liable to
them for their inaccuracy.").
141. See, e.g., FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1992). The court
rejected the argument that the institution had justifiably relied, however, after imput-
ing an agent's knowledge to the institution.
142. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) ("Because most publicly avail-
able information is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any public ma-
terial misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5
action.").
143. See Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins. Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 189, 190 (N.D.
Tex. 1994) (enforcing an agreement limiting punitive damages); John D. Calamari &
Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts § 14-3, at 589 (3d ed. 1987) ("Traditionally ... punitive
damages are not awarded in contract actions, no matter how malicious the breach.").
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thereby permitting the winner in any necessary litigation to recover its
legal fees."' Indemnification agreements might also be used.1 45
The benefits to such negotiated damage terms are difficult to over-
state, not only from the perspective of risk management, but from the
perspective of economic efficiency. Agreed-upon damages would al-
low the parties to address up front the foreseeable risks of non-per-
formance, and to allocate those risks in accordance with the
economics of the transaction-before litigators have the opportunity
to start exaggerating in opposite directions. For the user, this means
he could understand precisely the level of risk the professional was
assuming and conduct his affairs accordingly. The professional, for his
part, could not only understand the risks, but appropriately plan, con-
duct, and price the engagement.
The user, the professional, and society would all benefit.
H. The Statute of Limitations
In the first instance, the issue of the statute of limitations-the time
period in which an adversary must bring a claim-seems to favor lia-
bility in tort over liability in contract. The reason is straightforward.
The statutes of limitations for breach of contract tend to be longer
than the statutes of limitations for a tort.'4 6 Under section 10(b), for
example, the statute of limitations is at most three years.1 47 Under the
law of one midwestern state, in contrast, the victim of a contract
breach has fifteen years in which to assert a claim. 48
144. Werner F. Ebke, In Search of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections on Corpo-
rate Governance and the Independent Auditor's Responsibilities, 79 Nw. U. L Rev.
663, 687 (1984) (citations omitted).
145. While their utility is without dispute, there is some question as to the circum-
stances in which indemnification clauses will be permitted. Since the 1930s, the SEC
has held that a complete indemnification agreement impairs an auditor's indepen-
dence in attest engagements. See Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 2498, 11 Fed.
Reg. 10922 (1941); SEC Accounting Series, Financial Reporting Release No. 1, [1982]
7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,274, at 62,910. The SEC has stated a belief that the
threat of liability provides an incentive for auditors to perform work diligently, and
that complete indemnification provides for an inappropriate mutuality of financial
interest.
The Ethics Committee of the AICPA has ruled that one form of limited indemnifi-
cation is acceptable. Specifically, the Ethics Committee has concluded that an agree-
ment to release, indemnify, defend, and hold harmless a member from any liability
and costs resulting from knowing misrepresentations by management would not im-
pair independence. See AICPA, 2 AICPA Professional Standards, at ET § 191.188-89(June 1, 1996). The SEC has not precluded this position. See, e.g., SEC Release No.
2498, supra (focusing on impairment caused by immunity from "liability for his own
negligent acts" (emphasis added)).
146. Howard M. Garfield & Thomas Weathers, A Survey of Accountant Malprac-
rice.. Breach of Contract or Tort?, in Accountants' Liability 1995, at 271, 274 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-526, 1995).
147. Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991).
148. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.06 (Anderson 1991).
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This does not completely end the analysis, though, because the stat-
utory time period is not the only consideration. Another considera-
tion is the triggering event-that which causes the statute of
limitations to begin to run. A common aspect of tort law, for exam-
ple, is that a statute of limitations on a claim for misrepresentation
does not commence to run until the victim "knew or should have
known" that a misrepresentation has been made. 49 Such a provision
(and it is fairly common) can potentially keep a statute of limitations
from running almost indefinitely.
The event triggering the statute of limitations as to a contract claim
is generally more clear: it is the breach. 150 Though the laws of the
states are not entirely consistent, the statute of limitations in many
states commences to run even if the victim of the breach is unaware of
it.15 1 On the one hand, therefore, tort claims generally have shorter
limitations periods; on the other, the contract statute may be easier to
trigger. In the abstract, without focusing upon the precise law of a
particular state, it is difficult to generalize whether one is more advan-
tageous than the other.
But here, again, the ability of the parties in a contract-based system
to agree upon the terms of the engagement can constitute an impor-
tant advantage. By agreement, the parties can address both the length
of the limitations period and the events triggering its
commencement.'
52
What at first blush seems a clear preference for tort, therefore, on a
more detailed analysis becomes a closer call. To the extent that con-
tract-based liability gives the professional an opportunity to define the
statute of limitations and the triggering event, contract-based liability
seems optimal. In the absence of a contractual provision on the point,
it may be that a generalization outside the context of the law of a
particular state is too broad to be useful.
149. E.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 213.8 (McKinney 1990). See generally Prosser
on Torts, supra note 107, § 30, at 166-67.
150. See 18 Samuel Williston, Williston on Contracts § 2021A (3d ed. 1978).
151. See Ely-Cruikshank Co. v. Bank of Montreal, 615 N.E.2d 985, 987 (N.Y. 1993)
("[T]he statutory period of limitations begins to run from the time when liability for
wrong has arisen even though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of
the wrong or injury." (citing Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 200 N.E.
824 (N.Y. 1936))). But see Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco, Inc., 991 F.2d 21, 25 (1st
Cir. 1993) (observing that generally, in the absence of a specific UCC rule to the
contrary, a statute of limitation will not begin to run until notice of a claim in tort or
contract), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 85 F.3d 752 (1st Cir. 1996).
152. 6A Corbin, supra note 135, § 1445, at 483 ("[P]arties can by agreement in ad-
vance limit the bringing of suit upon a contract to a shorter period than that fixed by
the otherwise applicable statute of limitations, if the period agreed upon is not so
short as to be unreasonable.").
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I. Contributory and Comparative Negligence
The defenses of contributory and comparative negligence rest upon
the premise that the professional should not be liable in negligence (it
does not apply to fraud) to the extent the user of financial information
has caused his own harm.15 3 Where the user of financial information
contributed to his harm through his own negligence, the professional's
liability should be reduced or eliminated. Since accountant malprac-
tice litigation almost always involves some level of wrongdoing by the
client, this defense can be very important.' -
In the context of this defense, though, whether liability is premised
in tort or in contract will not necessarily make a big difference. The
law recognizes the conduct of a plaintiff as a defense both to negli-
gence and contract claims. In tort, the concept is that the plaintiff's
negligence will generally either eliminate or (in comparative negli-
gence states) reduce proportionately the liability of the defendant. 55
In contract, although the plaintiff's contributory negligence is techni-
cally not a defense,'5 6 the plaintiff's conduct may nevertheless limit
153. See generally Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 454 (7th Cir.)
("If the [auditor's] misrepresentation is negligent rather than intentional, contributory
negligence plays the same role it would play in an ordinary negligence case."), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Halla Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie & Co., 454
N.W.2d 905, 909 (Minn. 1990) ("[T]he persons who hire accountants, usually business-
persons, should also be required to conduct their business activities in a reasonable
and prudent manner."); Causey, Jr. & Causey, supra note 126, at 197-99 (discussing
the availability of contributory and comparative negligence defenses in accounting
malpractice cases); David L. Menzel, The Defense of Contributory Negligence in Ac-
countant's Malpractice Actions, 13 Seton Hall L. Rev. 292 (1983) (discussing the two
factual variations where the defenses are available in accountant liability cases).
154. See, e.g., Stratton v. Sacks, 99 B.R. 686, 695 (D. Md. 1989) ("[T]he doctrine of
contributory negligence is a complete bar to any recovery by the Trustee."), affd, 900
F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1990); Coopers & Lybrand v. Trustees of the Archdiocese, 536 So.
2d 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming jury apportionment of 40% of defalcation
loss to client); Devco Premium Fm. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 450 So. 2d 1216, 1219-
20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (recounting the trial court's finding that management,
and not the auditor, had the primary responsibility to establish and maintain a system
of internal accounting control, and approving the trial court's apportionment of 80%
of the total damages to the company); Capital Mortgage Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand,
369 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding jury allocation of more than
68% of embezzlement loss to client).
155. See Causey, Jr. & Causey, supra note 126, at 197-99. Where the plaintiff is the
accountant's client, the contributory negligence issue is sometimes complicated by the
so-called "National Surety doctrine" providing that contributory negligence is only a
defense where the client's conduct directly contributes to the accountant's failure to
perform. See National Sur. Corp. v. Lybrand, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (App. Div. 1939).
156. Becker v. Bancohio Nat'l Bank, 478 N.E.2d 776,781 (Ohio 1985) (holding that
contributory negligence was not a defense to an action for breach of contract); Dob-
son & Johnson, Inc. v. Von Weiland, 644 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tenn. 1982) (same); cf.
Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954, 971 (W.D. Ark. 1986) ("The court suspects that
plaintiffs fear that if they are forced into a cause of action sounding in negligence,
they will face defenses, i.e., contributory negligence, not ordinarily available to [an]
action on a contract.").
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recovery where the defendant's performance "was prevented or sub-
stantially hindered by the plaintiff.' '1 57
In some contexts, though, the extent to which the claim is in tort as
opposed to contract may be important. First, as indicated above, on a
contract claim a defense premised on the plaintiff's misconduct may
be limited to conduct that hinders the auditor's performance, while
the defense in tort may not be so limited 158 (though in contract the
157. 4 Corbin, supra note 135, § 947, at 814; see Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman,
686 F.2d 449, 453-54 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 245 (1979). In Cenco, the court stated:
Because these theories of auditors' misconduct are so alike, the defenses
based on misconduct of the audited firm or its employees are also alike,
though verbalized differently. A breach of contract is excused if the prom-
isee's hindrance or failure to cooperate prevented the promisor from per-
forming the contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 245 (1979).
The corresponding defense in the case of negligence is, of course, contribu-
tory negligence.
Cenco, 686 F.2d at 453.
158. Actually, the extent to which the plaintiffs conduct need hinder the auditor's
performance to constitute contributory negligence in tort is a subject of notorious
confusion. Two cases illustrate the problem: Craig v. Anyon, 208 N.Y.S. 259 (App.
Div. 1925), affd, 152 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1926), and National Sur. Corp. v. Lybrand, 9
N.Y.S.2d 554 (App. Div. 1939).
In Craig v. Anyon, a brokerage house employee embezzled a large amount of
money over a five-year period from the brokerage house commodities department.
208 N.Y.S. at 260. The brokerage house sued its auditors for negligence in failing to
discover the theft. Id. The auditors asserted the brokerage house's negligence in its
failure to supervise the embezzling employee. Id. at 260-61. The New York Appellate
Division permitted the defense:
The plaintiffs in effect contend that defendants are chargeable with negli-
gence because of failure to detect Moore's wrongdoing, wholly overlooking
the fact that, although they were closely affiliated with Moore, who was con-
stantly under their supervision, they were negligent in failing properly to
supervise his acts, or to learn the true condition of their own business and to
detect his wrongdoing.
Id. at 269.
But the same court reached a different result under seemingly similar facts. In Na-
tional Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, a cashier embezzled money from a brokerage house's
petty cash account over a nine-year period. 9 N.Y.S.2d at 556. The cashier concealed
the theft by "kiting" checks. Id. The brokerage house sued its auditors, claiming that,
had the cashier's thefts been discovered during the audit, he would have been fired
and further losses prevented. Id. at 557. The auditors claimed that the brokerage
house's own negligence constituted contributory negligence. Id. at 557, 563. The court
refused to permit the defense. Finding that auditors "are commonly employed for the
very purpose of detecting defalcations which the employer's negligence has made pos-
sible," the court held that the employer's negligence is a defense "only when it has
contributed to the accountant's failure to perform his contract and to report the
truth." Id. at 563; see Shapiro v. Glekel, 380 F. Supp. 1053, 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
("The later cases, both in New York and elsewhere, do not attempt to clarify the
apparent conflict between Craig v. Anyon and Lybrand or to reconcile their holdings.
Indeed, these cases have been cited, perhaps erroneously, for the same legal proposi-
tion."); Dinallo, supra note 129, at 343-51 (discussing the confusion regarding the
availability of a contributory negligence defense in accounting malpractice cases);
Travis M. Dodd, Note, Accounting Malpractice and Contributory Negligence: Justify-
ing Disparate Treatment Based upon the Auditor's Unique Role, 80 Geo. LJ. 909, 924-
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factual points relevant to the negligence of the plaintiff might be
raised in the context of causation or foreseeability). 19 Second, where
the plaintiff is not a party to the engagement contract, but is nonethe-
less a third-party beneficiary (an identified bank, say, in the context of
a lending decision), the plaintiff's contributory negligence would not
appear to be a defense to a contract claim absent a contractual provi-
sion to that effect, though the negligence of such a person may be a
defense to a claim in tort.
Whatever the case, here, too, principles of contract would allow the
parties to allocate between themselves the precise responsibilities of
each.16° Again, economic efficiency would be served thereby, insofar
as the parties would have a precise understanding of their responsibili-
ties and could tailor their conduct accordingly. In the absence of an
27 (1992) (same); see also Hall & Co. v. Steiner & Mondore, 543 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191-92
(App. Div. 1989) (citing both Anyon and Lybrand for the Anyon rule). Other juris-
dictions outside New York have adopted the so-called National Surety rule. See Lin-
coln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 345 N.W.2d 300, 307 (Neb. 1984); Jewelcor
Jewelers & Distribs., Inc. v. Corr, 542 A.2d 72, 79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
Mercifully, the modem trend, at least in comparative negligence states, is simply to
permit the defense and leave it up to the jury. See e.g., Standard Chartered PLC v.
Price Waterhouse, Nos. 1 CA-CV 93-0461, 1 CA-CV 93-0442, 1996 WL 640702, at *38
(Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 1996) ("We hold, therefore, that the National Surety doctrine
does not apply in Arizona .... ."); Scioto Mem. Hosp. Ass'n v. Price Waterhouse, 659
N.E.2d 1268, 1272-73 (Ohio 1996) (rejecting National Surety as inapplicable in a com-
parative negligence jurisdiction); see also Devco Premium Fmn. Co. v. North River Ins.
Co., 450 So. 2d 1216, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("We decline to adopt [the Na-
tional Surety] holding because [it] was decided on principles of contributory negli-
gence, a doctrine which has been repudiated in this State."); Capital Mortgage Corp.
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 369 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Mich. CL App. 1985) (rejecting a con-
tributory negligence defense, stating "[w]ith comparative negligence the result is not
so harsh and the policy considerations that accountants should not be allowed to
avoid all liability due to some negligence on the part of the client are not present. We
find the application of comparative negligence to be proper").
159. Causation: see Haven Assocs. v. Donro Realty Corp., 503 N.Y.S.2d 826, 830
(App. Div. 1986) ("It was Donro's burden to show that Haven's breach contributed in
a substantial measure to its damages, whereupon the burden shifted to Haven to
prove that some intervening cause... contributed to the damages."). But see Williams
Enters., Inc. v. Strait Mfg. & Welding, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 12,23 (D.D.C. 1990) ("Even
if ... other causes had made some contribution to the particular delay charged, de-
fendants would remain liable because Smoot has proved that the action of defendants
was a 'substantial factor' in causing injury to plaintiff."), affd in part, 938 F,2d 230
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
Forese-eability- Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 537 N.E.2d 176, 180 (N.Y. 1989)
("[D]amages which may be recovered by a party for breach of contract are restricted
to those damages which were reasonably foreseen or contemplated by the parties
during their negotiations or at the time the contract was executed." (citing Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854))); 5 Corbin, supra note 135,
§§ 1007, 1009 (damages are recoverable only for injury that there was reason to fore-
see at the time of contracting).
160. For example, an engagement letter could provide that any third-party benefici-
ary could recover for breach of contract only to the extent that the third-party benefi-
ciary acted reasonably.
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agreed-upon allocation, the law will fill the void, though rarely with
the economic precision of the parties doing so themselves.
While a more precise analysis probably requires a state-by-state dis-
cussion, suffice it to say that, to some extent, negligence on the part of
a client will generally be a defense in both tort and contract,' 61 though
the extent to which the misconduct of third parties is a defense is less
clear.
J. Third-Party Practice
Another important consideration is the professional's ability to
bring into an adversary proceeding a non-party who may also be cul-
pable for the victim's harm. To an accountant, this ability to bring
such third-party claims can be critical, because the accountant will fre-
quently be the focus of litigation not because he or she was the pri-
mary wrongdoer, but because he or she is the deep pocket. In such an
instance, the accountant will want to commence third-party claims
against the primary wrongdoer and thereby permit the fact-finder to
allocate blame accordingly.
This consideration plainly militates in favor of liability based in tort,
because the commencement of third-party litigation arising out of tort
claims is easy. The normal device is a claim for "contribution," pursu-
ant to which the professional essentially alleges that some other
wrongdoer, not presently a participant in the litigation, should share
in the blame.' 62 The result is that the fact-finder may then allocate
blame between the professional and the third-party defendant accord-
ing to the proportionate fault of each.
Where liability is based in contract, it will be more difficult to bring
in such third-party wrongdoers, because there is no claim for contribu-
tion in contract. The issue is simply whether the professional
breached or not.
This does not, however, necessarily mean that the professional may
not commence third-party litigation where the claim is based in con-
tract rather than tort. While a contribution claim is not available,
there may be available independent claims by the professional against
these other wrongdoers for breach of contract or misrepresentation,
insofar as the typical scenario will involve a failure by the wrongdoer
161. See Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954, 972 (W.D. Ark. 1986) ("Interest-
ingly, the resolution reached by Lincoln Grain-that the contributory negligence of
the audited client is a defense only where it has contributed to the accountant's failure
to perform the contract-bears strong resemblance to the contract doctrine that one
is not responsible for his failure to perform if he was frustrated in doing so by the
plaintiff.").
162. See Prosser on Torts, supra note 107, § 50, at 337-38; see also Musick, Peeler &
Garrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286, 288 (1993) (defendants in a Rule 10b-5 action
have a right to contribution, or to collect "from other joint tortfeasors who have paid
no damages or paid less than their fair share").
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to provide the professional with accurate information.'6 Also, to the
extent the wrongdoer is an official or employee of the client company,
as will frequently be the case, a defense based on the hindrance of
performance of the professional's contractual obligation may be
available.'6
Nonetheless, few procedural devices can match the simplicity and
ease of commencement of third-party claims based on contribution.
The unavailability of contribution, therefore, is a disadvantage to a
liability scheme premised in contract.
K. The Cost of Litigation
No discussion of risk management would be complete without some
mention of the cost of litigation itself, putting aside the prospects for
success. For the simple fact is that the litigation process can be enor-
mously expensive, both in terms of money and in terms of distraction
to the professional organization and its members.
Here, a liability system premised in contract may have a real advan-
tage, insofar as the parties can agree at the outset that any dispute will
163. See Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 770 F.2d 717, 718-19 (8th
Cir. 1985) ("Grant, a public accounting firm, alleges that it was injured as the result of
a pervasive scheme of mail and wire fraud designed by Tiffany to obtain a favorable
audit for the fiscal year 1977 .... Grant has standing to assert its claims."), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., 918 F. Supp.
749, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("BDO does not simply seek indemnification for its attor-
neys fees. BDO has identified other harms that it has suffered due to [the directors']
alleged negligent misrepresentation in connection with this lawsuit."); Coopers &
Lybrand v. Shapira, No. 92-1938, slip op. at 14-16 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1993) ("[Coopers
& Lybrand] contends that Shapira, in his position as Chief Executive Officer and
Treasurer of Phar-Mor, had a duty to supervise the other defendants, to verify that
the statements made by him and others in the comfort letters were accurate, and to
take steps to ensure that the statements were in fact accurate.... [Tihe motion to
dismiss... will be denied at this stage of the proceedings."); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig.,
793 F. Supp. 1306, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("This case is similar to In re Cenco."); Alva-
rado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 554 (D. Colo. 1989) ("[Sluch claims
are independently viable pendent state claims."); In re Wedtech Corp., 87 B.R 279,
287 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The Cenco court .... understandably drew a distinction
between the indemnity and tort claims."); cf. Cullen v. Riley, 957 F.2d 1020, 1033 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding that "although judgment reduction compensates a nonsettling de-
fendant for his lost rights of indemnity and contribution, it does not necessarily com-
pensate him for other lost claims"). See generally Seidman & Seidman v. Cenco Inc.,
642 F. Supp. 539, 541 (N.D. MI. 1986) (finding that a claim for fraud was not barred by
a waiver of a right to seek indemnity, and stating that "[i]n the law, 'recovery under
principles of contribution or indemnity' is, quite simply, a different animal from 're-
covery under principles of direct tort liability."'); Seidman & Seidman v. Cenco Inc.,
601 F. Supp. 336, 340-41 (N.D. MI. 1984) (holding that a waiver of a right to seek
indemnity did not bar a claim for fraud); Young, supra note 129, at 2169-72 (discussing
the viability of independent claims by accountants).
164. See Causey, Jr. & Causey, supra note 126, at 197-99; 4 Corbin, supra note 135,
§ 947, at 814 ("To one who is sued for non-performance of his promise it is a defense




be resolved not through state or federal litigation, but through some
private mechanism of alternative dispute resolution. 165 The engage-
ment may also provide for, within certain limits, indemnification of
costs and attorneys' fees.
L. Overall
While there is a need to understand the limits of broad generaliza-
tions, particularly as to matters of state law, the advantages of a con-
tract-based system of liability for the accounting profession may be
significant. The principal reason, broadly stated, is that a system of
contract permits the opportunity for the parties to address, negotiate,
and allocate responsibility for the various matters that may arise sub-
sequent to the professional engagement.
That is not to say, however, that there are no practical difficulties
compromising the implementation or effectiveness of a contract-based
liability system. Important ones would include:
* Though it is quite true as a matter of law that parties are,
with certain exceptions, free to agree on whatever they
want, there is a practical limit within the confines of a
competitive, commercial relationship to the extent to
which a professional may insert into the engagement terms
limitations on liability, disclaimers as to damages, reduc-
tions in the limitations period, etc. While in theory there
does exist a freedom of contract, its practical usefulness
therefore may be something less than the law would
permit.
* The law will always be sensitive to the cause of justice,
even where the parties to an agreement are sophisticated
commercial enterprises. That is particularly the case in the
context of CPA involvement with financial information,
the public interest in which is well established.' 66 There
165. For an overview of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") techniques poten-
tially applicable to accountant malpractice litigation, see American Arbitration Ass'n,
Resolving Professional Accounting and Related Services Disputes: A Guide to Alter-
native Dispute Resolution (Dec. 1993); AICPA, Alternative Dispute Resolution, A
Guide for State Societies (1993); CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, The ABCs of
ADR: A Dispute Resolution Glossary, 13 Alternatives 147 (1995) (describing the vari-
ous forms of ADR); Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1996, at 55 (describing current trends in ADR, specifically regarding mediation
and arbitration); Hans U. Stucki, Measuring the Merit of ADR, 14 Alternatives 81
(1996) (providing hard data demonstrating the cost savings of ADR over a multi-year
period).
166. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984). In
Arthur Young, the Supreme Court stated:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's finan-
cial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility tran-
scending any employment relationship with the client.... [The CPA] owes
ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as
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should be an expectation, therefore, that the law will not
permit a system of liability which permits the professional
to be exonerated to an extent the law deems unjust.
There are very practical impediments to the implementa-
tion of a contract system of liability in the context of public
companies and securities trading on the open markets.
Among other things, implementation of such a system is
likely to require some level of cooperation by the SEC.167
If a contract system could be implemented, however, there appear
to be, broadly stated, some very real benefits. Not the least of these is
increased efficiency in the allocation of responsibility between the
professional and the client, and a corresponding decrease in profes-
sional fees. Both would be of substantial benefit to society as a whole.
III. FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION AND THE "BESPEAKS
CAUTION" DOCTRINE
A. From the Past to the Future
As the systems of computer-based financial reporting evolve, a pre-
dictable effect may be that the information they produce will be used
less to understand the past, and more to predict the future.1 68 At the
same time, the demands of computerized real-time financial reporting
may not allow ample opportunity for an "audit" in the traditional
sense to take place, 169 so that the accounting profession will be in-
to the investing public.... [The CPA fills a] role as a disinterested analyst
charged with public obligations.
Id.
167. The SEC appears to be following closely the work of both the Jenkins and the
Elliott Committees. Last April, Commissioner Steven WaUman, who has taken a
strong interest in the evolution of financial reporting systems, commented: "The
work of both the AICPA special committee on financial reporting and the special
committee on assurance services strongly influences thoughts on providing additional
relevance to financial statements." SEC Sponsors Discussions on Future of Financial
Reporting, J. Acct., Apr. 1996, at 15, 15.
168. A reorientation of financial reporting more toward "a forward looking per-
spective" is a common theme of modem financial analysis. Jenkins Committee Re-
port, supra note 2, at 5, 22-23.
It is not difficult to conceptualize a financial reporting system in which financial
information users are plugged directly into the reporting entity's MIS and receive,
over a computer network, real-time information as to sales or other activity and, at
the same time, immediate translation of reporting-entity transactions into bottom-line
earnings per share. In such a context, three-month old financial data probably would
seem ancient.
169. In his September 1994 article entitled The Future of Audits, Robert Elliott
observed:
Once capital suppliers have real-time access to an enterprise's databases,
they will have little interest in annual financial statements-and, by exten-
sion, auditors' opinions on them-issued well after the entity's fiscal
yearend. What they might be far more interested in is real-time assurance
from the auditor that either the information in the enterprise's databases is
reliable or the system itself is highly likely to produce reliable data.
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creasingly called upon to provide assurance not as to historical finan-
cial information itself, but as to the systems by which future financial
information will be provided.' 70
A consequence of both trends may be to place increased emphasis
upon the forward-looking components of a professional engagement.
For the accounting professional, the hazards are many. Forward-look-
ing data is inherently subjective, it never turns out to be exactly cor-
rect, and the prescience of hindsight can make the prognosticator look
foolish. It is the presentation of forward-looking information that can
give rise to some of the biggest risks in litigation.'7'
It is for these reasons that the so-called "bespeaks caution" doctrine
may play an increasingly important role. In instances in which the
disclosure of forward-looking information falls within the umbrella of
the doctrine's protection, the doctrine can preclude a claim even
where forward-looking information turns out to be materially incor-
rect. This section discusses the development of the "bespeaks cau-
tion" doctrine, the doctrine as now embodied in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995172 ("Reform Act"), and the doctrine's
potential applicability-both as a matter of common law and now as
Robert K. Elliott, The Future of Audits, J. Acct., Sept. 1994, at 74, 76; see Elliott
Committee Report, supra note 9, at <http'.wlwww.aicpa.orglassurancelscaslcomstud/ef-
fect/constr.htm> ("The profession's information-technology competencies will have to
broaden and deepen even to provide traditional services let alone to provide new
assurance services. Real-time auditing, for example, will require a far better under-
standing of systems and systems reliability.").
170. The practical implications of such a transformation are many, including the
potential elimination of "disappointing earnings" cases premised upon earnings that
unexpectedly do not fulfill analysts' expectations.
171. The risks associated with forward-looking information were illustrated graphi-
cally last year when, faced with a now-defeated California ballot initiative that would
have made easier the prosecution of securities class actions based on forward-looking
information, Intel Corporation simply announced the elimination of forward-looking
statements in its financial disclosures and abruptly cancelled a meeting with analysts.
See Intel Eliminates Forward-Looking Statements and Cancels Analyst Meeting Due to
California Ballot Initiative, Bus. Wire, Oct. 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BSWIRE File. The Wall Street Journal described Intel's action as follows:
Technology stocks got a boost three weeks ago when Intel said its future
looked brighter than analysts had forecast.
But if California voters approve a measure slated for the November bal-
lot, that may be the last rosy outlook Wall Street hears from the leading
computer-chip maker.
Intel is following the lead of another Silicon Valley technology company,
Novellus Systems, in refusing to discuss its prospects with investors for fear
of the potential effect of Proposition 211.
Intel, which Wall Street counted on for the best forward view of the semi-
conductor industry, on Monday canceled an Oct. 31 meeting with analysts
and announced it will report on its results only after the fact.
Patrick McGeehan, California Measure Causes Silence in Silicon Valley, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 9, 1996, at C1.
172. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1996)).
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embodied in the Reform Act-to systems assurance reports and fi-
nancial statements.
B. An Overview of the "Bespeaks Caution" Doctrine
The "bespeaks caution" doctrine is not fully developed, and its pre-
cise boundaries have yet to be completely shaped. In its most basic
form, however, it provides that forward-looking statements about an-
ticipated financial performance may not constitute the basis for a mis-
representation claim if the risks are described plainly and honestly.
Thus, assuming that statements concerning projections and expecta-
tions are coupled with adequate cautionary language (and, at least ac-
cording to some courts, made in good faith), they are not actionable as
fraud.
1. Unremarkable Beginnings
The bespeaks-caution concept was first articulated twenty years
ago, in a footnote and without fanfare, by the Eighth Circuit in Polin
v. Conductron Corp.17 3 In that case, an investor brought an action
against a company whose stock he had purchased, and against some of
the company's officers and directors, claiming that the company's an-
nual reports and other documents contained fraudulent statements. 74
Among other things, the investor attacked statements regarding "an-
ticipated" losses, "expected" improvements, and a "possibility" of a
future break-even.'" The court held that these statements were not
actionably fraudulent, because they "bespeak caution in outlook and
fall far short of the assurances required for a finding of falsity and
fraud.' 1
76
The doctrine received little subsequent attention over the next nine
years. In 1986, however-as a plethora of securities suits hit the fed-
eral courts arising from the investment and acquisition activity of the
1980s-the doctrine established an important beachhead in the Sec-
ond Circuit. The case was Luce v. Edelstein, 77 and it involved an in-
vestor who claimed, among other things, that an offering
memorandum contained intentional misrepresentations as to the in-
vestment's potential cash and tax benefits. 78 The offering memoran-
dum had cautioned, however, that its projections of these potential
benefits were mere predictions that would not necessarily come to fru-
173. 552 F.2d 797, 806 n.28 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977).
174. Id. at 803.
175. Id. at 806 n.28.
176. Id.
177. 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
178. Id- at 56.
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ition.179  The Second Circuit held that these statements were not
fraudulent as a matter of law.18 0 The reason was that
the Offering Memorandum made it quite clear that its projections of
potential cash and tax benefits were "necessarily speculative in na-
ture" and that "[n]o assurance [could] be given that these projec-
tions [would] be realized." Indeed, the Offering Memorandum
warned prospective investors that "[a]ctual results may vary from
the predictions and these variations may be material."' 81
The court concluded that "[w]e are not inclined to impose liability on
the basis of statements that clearly 'bespeak caution."' "' 1
With the imprimatur of the Second Circuit, judicial acceptance of
the bespeaks-caution doctrine began to expand, first among courts
within the Second Circuit and then into the other circuits as well. As
things stand today, the doctrine has been adopted, in some form or
another, by nine of the twelve federal judicial circuits: the First Cir-
cuit, 8 3 Second Circuit,184 Third Circuit, 8 5 Fourth Circuit,186 Fifth Cir-
cuit,"s Sixth Circuit,'88 Eighth Circuit,8 9 Ninth Circuit, 9 0 and
Eleventh Circuit. 9' In addition, the Seventh Circuit appears to have
recognized the validity of the doctrine, though it has yet to use it to
dismiss a case.' 92 The Supreme Court has not explicitly accepted the
doctrine. The Court has, however, declined to review one case dis-
missing a complaint based on the doctrine, 93 and there is no reason to
presume the Court would reject it out of hand.194
179. Id
180. Id
181. Id (alterations in original).
182. Id
183. Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1991).
184. I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991).
185. In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.-Ta Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1178 (1994).
186. Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1994).
187. Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994).
188. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993).
189. Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 949 F.2d 243 (8th
Cir. 1991).
190. In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 277 (1995).
191. Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., Ltd., 45 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 1995).
192. See Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 1392, 1404-06 (7th Cir.
1995); see also United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1167 (7th Cir.) ("Although
Harden implicitly recognizes the viability of the 'bespeaks caution' doctrine in this
circuit as a defense in securities fraud cases, we have yet to encounter a case where
the doctrine applied to negate the materiality of a misleading statement as a matter of
law."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 181 (1996).
193. See Gollomp v. Trump, 510 U.S. 1178 (1994).
194. In fact, the bespeaks-caution doctrine is entirely consistent with the Court's
recent observation that otherwise-actionable misstatements will not support liability if
accompanied by sufficient objectively true statements, so that the true statements
"would exhaust the misleading conclusion's capacity to influence" a reasonable inves-
tor. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097-98 (1991). In its most
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2. The Doctrine in Operation: The Trump Taj Mahal
One of the most well-publicized of the bespeaks-caution cases,195
and one that vividly shows the doctrine's power to bring to an abrupt
halt potential securities claims based on forward-looking information,
arose out of Donald Trump's attempt to finance and complete con-
struction of his Taj Mahal casino and hotel in Atlantic City.
The circumstances were these. Trump needed to raise $675 million
to purchase, complete construction on, and open the Taj Mahal.19 6
The investment would, however, be high risk: the hotel and casino
obviously had no track record; construction was not even finished; and
the industry was exceedingly competitive. 97 Trump chose to raise
money through a public offering of investment bonds. Reflective of
the risk, the bonds bore an interest rate of 14%-a full 5% higher
than the yield offered on quality corporate bonds at the time.' In-
vestors were given a prospectus that vividly described the risks in-
volved, including those arising from the intense competition in the
Atlantic City casino and hotel market and anticipated restraints on
growth of the casinos' win from gaming."" Other disclosed risks in-
cluded: that the Taj Mahal had absolutely no operating history, that
its debt service would depend completely on still-untried operations,
and that interest payments would come due before the casino could
generate peak season cash flow.2"0 Investors snapped it up.201
As it turned out, the Taj Mahal did not perform as hoped. And
when press reports and industry gossip raised the specter of bank-
basic form, moreover, the bespeaks-caution doctrine is a fairly straightforward appli-
cation of well-established principles of law regarding the elements of a fraud claim. It
is one of the most basic prerequisites, for example, that the statement at issue be
materially false or misleading. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996). The central inquiry is
"whether defendants' representations, taken together and in context, would have mis-
led a reasonable investor." McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 900
F.2d 576, 579 (2d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 501 U.S. 1249 (1991). In addition, a plaintiff
must show that he relied on the false statement or omission to his detriment and that
such reliance was reasonable. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164,
180 (1994). At its root, the bespeaks-caution doctrine is the logical application of
these principles in the context of forward-looking information. See Worlds of Wonder,
35 F.3d at 1414 ("[T]he doctrine, when properly construed, merely represents the
pragmatic application of two fundamental concepts in the law of securities fraud: ma-
teriality and reliance.").
195. See Floyd Norris, Junk Bond Ruling Could Aid Companies in Fraud Suits,
N.Y. Tunes, Oct. 16, 1993, at 39.
196. In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 364-65
(3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1178 (1994). See generally Michael R. Young,
When Investors Rely on Financial Projections: Ruling Gives New Protection from
Lawsuits, J. Acct., Feb. 1994, at 26, 26 (discussing the potential significance of the
Trump decision to the accounting profession).
197. Trump, 7 F.3d at 370.
198. kd at 364.
199. Id. at 370.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 364.
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ruptcy, investors sued. 2 The main allegation was that the prospectus
falsely stated that the defendants believed the funds generated by Taj
Mahal operations would be sufficient to cover debt service.2 "3
The Third Circuit refused to find a claim. The reason, the court
explained, was that any statements in the prospectus as to anticipated
financial performance had to be considered in light of the "total mix"
of information available.2 4 According to the court, the total mix was
such that "no reasonable investor could believe anything but that the
Taj Mahal bonds represented a rather risky, speculative investment
which might yield a high rate of return, but which alternatively might
result in no return or even a loss. '' 205 Given this, the court continued,
the suing investors would be unable to prove the materiality of the
alleged misrepresentation-that the defendants believed the Taj
Mahal's funds from operations would be sufficient to cover debt ser-
vice.206 The court laid down the principle of law as follows:
[W]hen an offering document's forecasts, opinions or projections
are accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-
looking statements will not form the basis for a securities fraud
claim if those statements did not affect the "total mix" of informa-
tion the document provided investors. In other words, cautionary
language, if sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or misrepresen-
tations immaterial as a matter of law.2°7
The court thereby issued one of the clearest and most straightforward
articulations of the bespeaks-caution doctrine.208
3. The Doctrine Has Its Limits
While the bespeaks-caution doctrine is significant in limiting poten-
tial claims against accounting professionals, it has some important lim-
itations. One is that it generally only applies to forward-looking
202. Il at 365.
203. Id at 366.
204. Id at 371.
205. Id at 369.
206. Id
207. Id at 371.
208. Courts have also applied the bespeaks-caution doctrine to "fraud on the mar-
ket" claims, in which the plaintiff claims to have relied not on any particular statement
but rather on the integrity of the market. See, e.g., Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co.,
948 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1991).
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information.' ° Those drafting prospectuses must still get the history
right.2
10
Another important limitation is that vague or blanket warnings-
that is to say, boilerplate-may not be enough. The Third Circuit in
the Trump case, for example, made the observation that boiler-type
disclosures "ordinarily [would] be inadequate.121' To "bespeak cau-
tion" most effectively, cautionary statements should be substantive
and tailored to the specific statements being challenged.
Another potential limitation-and a particularly difficult one-in-
volves the extent to which the bespeaks-caution doctrine will preclude
a claim based on forward-looking projections, where the allegation is
that the defendant knew to a virtual certainty that the projections
could not be attained. The Sixth Circuit, for example, has raised the
possibility that investors should be given an opportunity to prove that
allegedly-fraudulent forward-looking statements were not genuinely
believed. 12 Similarly, a New York district court has suggested that
209. See In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 974-75 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
The ZZZZ Best court noted:
Logically, the doctrine would best apply to predictions and statements that
are speculative in nature because of the inherent risk in predicting the
future....
The information ... had nothing to do with future predictions or specula-
tive conclusions ....
[Tihis Court finds that the bespeaks caution doctrine is not applicable
in this case.
Id
210. The clarity of the proposition that the bespeaks-caution doctrine applies only
to forward-looking information has recently been muddied. Last December, the
Fourth Circuit issued an opinion suggesting that the doctrine may apply to misstate-
ments of historical fact. Gasner v. Board of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 1996).
In Gasner, the state government issued municipal bonds to finance the purchase of
equipment for a new waste treatment facility. Id. at 354. Revenue from the facility
fell short of expectations; the project was abandoned; and the issuer defaulted on the
bonds. Id Investors sued. kd at 355. They claimed that the prospectus's assurance
that the facility would employ "proven" technology was an actionable misrepresenta-
tion because the technology was in fact experimental. Id. at 356-57.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that, even to the extent the assertion as to "proven"
technology was false, it was rendered immaterial by cautionary language concerning
the future viability of the project. Id. at 359. The court reached this conclusion even
though the cautionary language did not concern the track record of the technology
being used. Id. The dissent argued that the bespeaks-caution doctrine did not apply
to such misrepresentations of historical fact, and that "cautionary language regarding
predictions of the Facility's future success does not excuse the [issuer's] alleged mis-
representation of current and existing facts regarding the nature of the technology."
Id. at 364-65.
211. Trump, 7 F.3d at 371. SEC chairman Arthur Levitt has recently observed that
reporting entities appear to be relying too heavily on boilerplate, and that "[g]ood
cautionary language should provide the reader with disclosure through the eyes of
management, not litigation counsel." Levitt Outlines Ideas for Modernizing the 1933
Act, SEC Today, Jan. 27, 1997, at 1.
212. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993). The court stated:
Material statements which contain the speaker's opinion are actionable
under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act if the speaker does not
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the doctrine would not render immaterial forward-looking statements
about expected profits and tax benefits that the speaker knew to be
false.2 13 And when the Seventh Circuit 14 was asked to determine
whether the doctrine was triggered by the cautionary statement that
"[i]f [the company's] plans to restore profitability to its day-to-day op-
erations are not successful... the Company's stockholder's equity will
continue to erode, ' 215 the court held that the statement was not pro-
tected, since the plaintiff contended that no such plans in fact
existed. 16
There is intuitive appeal, at least in the first instance, to the proposi-
tion that the bespeaks-caution doctrine should not protect forward-
looking projections the defendant does not believe to be attainable.
To conclude otherwise is arguably to invite nefarious schemers to
commit fraud. The problem is that, to the extent that exception is
permitted, it will immediately swallow the rule. The plaintiffs' bar will
quickly come to realize that, to circumvent the doctrine, it need only
include an allegation that the defendant did not believe in the
achievability of projected performance. Since the Rule 9(b)217 partic-
ularity requirements are more relaxed for pleading state of mind, such
an allegation would presumably be made in every instance. The be-
speaks-caution doctrine-at least at common law-would meet an ab-
rupt and unceremonious end.
Perhaps the answer is that the Third Circuit got it right in the
Trump case when it rejected precisely this kind of allegation-that the
defendants did not sincerely believe that projected performance was
believe the opinion and the opinion is not factually well-grounded. See, e.g.,
Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1992); cf. Virginia
Bankshares [v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083] (1991) (opinions are actionable
under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act). Whether the state-
ments here were true or false is not an issue to be decided under Rule
12(b)(6). Ehrenberg and Mayer assert as a fact, in paragraph twenty of their
complaints, that numerous Michigan National statements, which were either
purely factual or which contained the speaker's opinion, were false, or were
misleading due to material omissions. These assertions are sufficient for
purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) because material statements of opinion, if not
truly believed and not supported by available facts, are actionable under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
988 F.2d at 639.
213. Griffin v. McNiff, 744 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 996 F.2d 303 (2d
Cir. 1993).
214. Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1995).
215. IL at 1405 (quoting Raffensperger's application of the defense) (first alteration
in original).
216. Id at 1405-06.
217. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) provides that "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and
other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." Id. A number of
states, including Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio,
have enacted similar provisions. See Del. Super. Ct. R. 9(b); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.120(b);




attainable-as a proper predicate for a claim.218 A different rule
would only further the expansion of litigation whenever forward-look-
ing projections were not attained, and exacerbate the horrific eco-
nomic inefficiency that results from capital markets in which, in
substance, the reward of a risky investment is captured by the investor
but the risk is spread to everyone.219 As long as investors know the
rules before hand, they can seek a return on their investment they
believe to be commensurate with the risk.
4. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
Almost twenty years after its footnote debut,10 the bespeaks-cau-
tion doctrine was elevated to marquee status in the "tort reform" leg-
islation enacted by Congress in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.1 In essence, the Reform Act amended the Se-
curities Act of 19 33 m and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934w3 toimplement legislatively the salient features of the common law doc-
trine 4 -referred to in the statute as a "safe harbor" for forward-
looking statements.215 A critical consideration is that, according to
the legislative history,1 6 the Reform Act safe harbor was intended to
supplement, not replace, the doctrine at common law.2 7 Also, signifi-
cant areas are left unaddressed by the Reform Act-such as state
law.'2 It appears that both the Reform Act safe harbor, and the com-
218. In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 372 (3d
Cir. 1993) (citing Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991)), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1178 (1994).
219. Ebke, supra note 144, at 682 ("The process of expanding auditor's liabilities
therefore appears to be one of socializing losses and individualizing profits.").
220. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
221. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1996)).
222. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-I (1994).
223. Id. § 78a-ll.
224. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 31, 43 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 742 and in James Hamilton, CCH, Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995: Law & Explanation 59, 68 (1996) ("The Conference Committee
safe harbor ... is based on aspects of SEC Rule 175 and the judicial created 'bespeaks
caution' doctrine.").
225. The Reform Act has other provisions of direct interest to the accounting pro-
fession. See generally Quinton F. Seamons, Audit Standards and Detection of Fraud
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 24 Sec. Reg. LJ. 259
(1996).
226. As one commentator has noted, however, it is not certain that courts will give
effect to such statements of legislative intent. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51
Bus. Law. 975, 975-76 (1996).
227. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 369, at 46, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 745 and
in Hamilton, supra note 224, at 70 ("The Conference Committee does not intend for
the safe harbor provisions [of the Reform Act] to replace the judicial 'bespeaks cau-
tion' doctrine or to foreclose further development of that doctrine by the courts.").
228. Modem watchers of securities litigation are familiar with a new phenomenon,
in which securities cases of the sort that traditionally would have been brought in
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mon law bespeaks-caution doctrine, will both play an important role
in future litigation.
The Reform Act defines a statement as "forward-looking" if it con-
tains projections, plans and objectives, or predictions of future eco-
nomic performance. 2 9 The Reform Act then provides two alternative
safe harbors for such statements. Under the first, a forward-looking
statement will not form the basis for liability if it is "identified as a
forward-looking statement, and is accompanied by meaningful cau-
tionary statements2 30 identifying important factors that could cause
actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking
statement," or is otherwise immaterial.2 3' Under the second, a for-
ward-looking statement will not form the basis for liability if the plain-
tiff fails to prove that the forward-looking statement, if made by a
natural person, was made with actual knowledge that the statement
was false or misleading, or, if made by a business entity, was made or
approved by an executive officer with actual knowledge that it was
false or misleading.22
The Reform Act has some important exceptions. For instance, the
"safe harbor" does not apply to, among other things, (1) statements
that are "included in a financial statement prepared in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles,' '233 (2) statements
made in connection with a tender offer,2-4 (3) statements made in con-
nection with an initial public offering, 5 or (4) statements concerning
a partnership or a limited liability company.236 And the Reform Act's
safe-harbor provisions only apply to forward-looking information con-
cerning established issuers subject to the reporting requirements of
section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the 1934 Act.237
federal court are now shifting into state courts with the federal claims having beenjettisoned completely. See Coffee, supra note 226, at 999. One possible effect may be
that state courts, though theoretically left unaffected by the Reform Act, will show an
increasing willingness to incorporate the bespeaks-caution doctrine into state com-
mon law. See, e.g., Rubin v. SI Management L.P., No. 10893/92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 23,
1993).
229. See generally 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-2(i)(1), 78u-5(i)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
230. According to the legislative history of the Reform Act,
boilerplate warnings will not suffice as meaningful cautionary statements
identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materi-
ally from those projected in the statement. The cautionary statements must
convey substantive information about factors that realistically could cause
results to differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking state-
ment, such as, for example, information about the issuer's business.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 369, at 43, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 742 and in Hamil-
ton, supra note 224, at 68.
231. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A), 78u-5(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1996).
232. Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(B), 78u-5(c)(1)(B).
233. Id. §§ 77z-2(b)(2)(A), 78u-5(b)(2)(A).
234. Id §§ 77z-2(b)(2)(C), 78u-5(b)(2)(C).
235. Id §§ 77z-2(b)(2)(D), 78u-5(b)(2)(D).
236. Id §§ 77z-2(b)(2)(E), 78u-5(b)(2)(E).
237. Id §§ 77z-2(a), 78u-5(a).
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C. The Applicability of the Doctrine to Systems Assurance Reports
In its typical form, the bespeaks-caution doctrine precludes claims
based on particular types of financial data-financial projections be-
ing a quintessential example. Fundamental to the development of fi-
nancial reporting, though, is not simply assurance directed to static
sets of financial data, but assurance directed to the systems by which
financial data is generated. This development in financial reporting
thus corresponds to a broader development in management theory
generally, which directs attention to the systems by which out-
put is generated,2 8 rather than simply to the output itself.239 In the
context of financial information, the importance of a trend from "data
assurance" to "systems assurance" is found in the need to increase the
timeliness of financial information, and the fact that, as mentioned
above, the demands of timeliness may not allow ample opportunity
for an "audit" of particular data in the traditional sense to take place.
It may be that, rather than waiting for a Form 10-K with months-old
financial information, future users will find themselves by way of com-
puter able to plug directly into the reporting entity's management in-
formation system.240
If financial reporting systems are to develop in this direction-and
it is almost inevitable that they will-it may be critical that the be-
speaks-caution doctrine develop in this direction with them. The issue
is thus presented: to what extent may the bespeaks-caution doctrine
be applicable not merely to practitioner reports on forward-looking
financial data, but to practitioner reports on the adequacy of a report-
ing entity's system by which future financial data is to be generated?
238. See W. Edwards Deming, Quality, Productivity and Competitive Position 22(1982) ("Quality comes not from inspection, but from improvement of the process.");
John 0. Whitney, The Economics of Trust: Liberating Profits and Restoring Corpo-
rate Vitality 22 (1994) ("The challenge to leaders is to understand fully the system
they are managing, to understand the interdependence of the various components, to
spend their creative energy improving the interface between the components as well
as improving the components themselves."). One text notes:
Deming's system, known as the Fourteen Points, ties together disparate pro-
cess-oriented management ideas into a single, holistic vision of how compa-
nies can anticipate and meet the desires of the customer by fostering a better
understanding of "the process" and by enlisting the help of every employee,
division, and supplier in the improvement effort.
Andrea Gabor, supra note 1, at 5.
239. Modem manufacturing quality assurance has moved away from an in-
spection-and-rework strategy and now relies heavily on a strategy of product
and/or process redesign to eliminate all possible sources of defects. This
proves to be both more effective (creating higher and continuously improv-
ing levels of quality) and more cost effective. Similarly, modem data quality
assurance will move away from data assurance and toward system assurance.
Elliott Committee Report, supra note 9, at <http'//www.aicpa.orglassurance/scas/com-
studfeffect/newopps.htm>.
240. See The CPA Journal Symposium on the Future of Assurance Services, 66 CPA
J., May 1996, at 14, 16; see also Wallman, Regulating in a World of Technological and
Global Change, supra note 16, at 64, 65 nn.1-2.
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At one level, such a system assurance report falls easily within the
same category of forward-looking information that is subject to the
bespeaks-caution doctrine. Whether the subject happens to be the fu-
ture data itself, or the future operation of a financial reporting system
by which the data will be generated, the essence of both is projection
into the future. On an intellectual level, a practitioner who issues a
forward-looking report on such a system should be every bit as enti-
tled to the benefit of the bespeaks-caution doctrine as a practitioner
who reported on a projection of the numbers themselves.
In fact, one court has come close to making exactly this connection.
Three years ago, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit faced a failed-investment case brought by investors in junk
bonds issued by the toy manufacturer Worlds of Wonder
("WOW"). 241 The investors sued, among others, WOW's outside au-
ditor, Deloitte & Touche.242 One of the key allegations was that
WOW's internal control system had been misleadingly described in
the junk bond prospectus.243 Among other things, the plaintiffs at-
tacked the following statement contained in the prospectus concern-
ing WOW's internal controls:
Information Systems and Control Procedures. The Company's
business has grown dramatically in the last year, and the Company's
development of its management information system and other sys-
tems and control procedures has at times lagged behind this growth.
While the Company continues to upgrade its systems, procedures
and controls to meet the demand of its expansion, there can be no
assurance that the Company can successfully implement these en-
hancements or that these enhancements will keep pace with the
growth. 24
The plaintiffs argued that this statement was misleading because
WOW's internal controls in truth had "crippling deficiencies," and
that "no reasonable investor reading the Prospectus would have con-
cluded that there were any existing problems with controls."' 45
The district court rejected this claim, stating:
Plaintiffs ignore the fact the Prospectus included an express dis-
claimer that "there can be no assurances" that WOW's existing in-
ternal controls would continue to be adequate given the rapid pace
at which the company was growing. The Prospectus made no pre-
dictions to the contrary. Thus, the Prospectus adequately bespoke
241. In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 277 (1995).
242. Id. at 1412.
243. Id. at 1416-17.




caution regarding this potential risk to WOW's investors. As a mat-
ter of law, Plaintiffs cannot have been misled 246
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, implicitly recognizing the applicability of
the bespeaks-caution doctrine to systems assurance. The court stated:
[C]ontrary to the plaintiffs' assertions, the Debenture Prospectus
did not state or imply that WOW's internal control problems were
"in the past" and not ongoing. Rather, the prospectus clearly
warned that the company's attempt to improve internal controls
could prove to be inadequate. Second, the plaintiffs presented no
evidence that WOW's internal controls at the time of the offering
were materially deficient. Indeed, the allegedly "devastating" man-
agement letter issued by Deloitte (two-and-a-half months after the
Debenture Offering) concluded that, although "significant
problems" existed, WOW's internal controls had no material weak-
nesses. And, third, WOW probably would not have needed to dis-
close even serious internal-control deficiencies. Cf Monroe v.
Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that an auditor
need not disclose internal controls).
The Debenture Prospectus, which noted that WOW had struggled
to maintain sufficient internal controls, clearly erred on the side of
over disclosure and was therefore not misleading. Ve affirm the
district court on this point.247
It may be that the Ninth Circuit, in so deciding, implicitly recog-
nized a potentially critical distinction between two types of systems
assurance reports. One type would provide assurance as to the per-
formance of the system at a point of time in the past. The other would
provide assurance as to the performance of the system into the future.
As to the former, an argument might be made that the inclusion of
cautionary language triggers bespeaks-caution protection, but it is far
from clear that that argument would be accepted by a discerning
court, insofar as the inquiry would likely focus more on the adequacy
of the internal control system at a particular point in time rather than
prospectively. As to the latter, the bespeaks-caution doctrine would
very much appear to be applicable, as the Ninth Circuit appeared to
accept.
To take full advantage of the doctrine as to systems assurance re-
ports that speak to the future, however, the profession should be
mindful that generic, vague, or blanket disclaimers (at least under
common law) may not be enough.2  In the context of systems assur-
ance as to a particular reporting entity, therefore, the practitioner
246. In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850, 865 (N.D. Cal. 1993),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277
(1995).
247. Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1417.
248. See, e.g., id. at 1414 (quoting the district court opinion, 814 F. Supp. at 858); see
also 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that a forward-look-
ing statement must be "accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying
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would do well to ensure the inclusion of detailed information as to
specific potential vulnerabilities of the system at issue. The inclusion
of such detailed and specific information, of course, to some extent
cuts against the goal of report standardization. It is possible that the
conflicting goals of adequate cautionary disclosure and report stand-
ardization could be reconciled by ensuring the inclusion of detailed
and specific cautionary disclosure within management's written asser-
tion rather than in the practitioner's report itself.
A final consideration is that, with the exception of the litigation in-
volving Worlds of Wonder in the Ninth Circuit, the applicability of the
bespeaks-caution doctrine to systems assurance is largely untested.
While the jurisprudential justification for the doctrine would appear
to be applicable to systems assurance, that applicability has yet to gain
any degree of broad judicial acceptance-or even to be widely
confronted.
D. The Applicability of the Doctrine to Financial Statements
A remaining issue is the extent to which the bespeaks-caution doc-
trine may be applicable to financial statements. As presently con-
figured, the doctrine's applicability to financial statements is far from
clear. As a general matter, the bespeaks-caution doctrine applies only
to forward-looking information-not to matters of historical fact. For
that reason, the court in In re ZZZZ Best Securities Litigation19 held
that the bespeaks-caution doctrine did not apply to a review report by
Ernst & Young. The court explained: "Logically, the doctrine would
best apply to predictions and statements that are speculative in nature
because of the inherent risk in predicting the future. The doctrine
loses its logical purpose when applied to statements made about al-
ready existing information like the Z Best audited financials covering
an already completed quarter. '250
Still, the intellectual underpinnings of the doctrine would appear tojustify its applicability to at least certain aspects of financial state-
ments. Aspects of financial statements-with receivables and reserves
being two good examples-include a significant element of prediction.
In substance, such items are frequently determined through careful
assessment of what is expected to happen in the future. To the extent
such financial statement items are accompanied by meaningful cau-
tionary disclosure, the bespeaks-caution doctrine would appear to be
every bit as applicable as to, say, a prediction of future revenues.
This intellectual justification appears to have been identified in the
new Reform Act.251 It also appears to have been rejected. The Re-
important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the
forward-looking statement").
249. 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
250. Id at 974.
251. 109 Stat. 737.
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form Act specifically provides that the safe harbor is not available for
statements that are "included in a financial statement prepared in ac-
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles."5- A con-
gressional intent to foreclose judicial application of the bespeaks-
caution doctrine-at least in the Reform Act-to traditional financial
statements seems fairly clear.
But that is not to say that Congress intended to preclude applicabil-
ity of the doctrine to financial statements beyond those it had in mind
when it passed the Reform Act. For one thing, there is no indication
that Congress intended to render the doctrine inapplicable to the fi-
nancial reporting systems of the future. Indeed, it was the explicit
purpose of Congress to open up the systems of financial reporting to
innovation and "to enhance market efficiency by encouraging compa-
nies to disclose forward-looking information. ' '253 The financial state-
ments of the future may be quite different than the financial
statements contemplated by Congress in 1995, particularly if, for ex-
ample, the recommendations of the Jenkins Committee are
implemented.
And even today's financial statements, if not protected by the Re-
form Act's safe harbor, may still be protected by common law. It is
thus important that Congress, in statutorily enacting a safe harbor for
forward-looking information, intended to discourage "[a]busive litiga-
tion," not to encourage it.2-1 Congress was accordingly careful to
make clear that it did not, in the Reform Act, "intend for the safe
harbor provisions to replace the judicial 'bespeaks caution' doctrine or
to foreclose further development of that doctrine by the courts." 5
It is therefore very much a relevant area of inquiry to consider the
extent to which the judicial underpinnings of the bespeaks-caution
doctrine under common law are relevant to claims based on the for-
ward-looking elements of financial statements. And those underpin-
nings appear very much to be applicable. As mentioned earlier, the
doctrine is simply a particular application of the well-established ma-
teriality and reasonable-reliance prerequisites. 256 If the notes to the
financial statements adequately apprise the user of the attendant risks
to realizing financial statement amounts, the bespeaks-caution doc-
trine should arguably preclude a finding of both materiality and rea-
sonable reliance on the forward-looking elements, and thereby
preclude a claim.
252. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-2(b)(2)(A), 78u-5(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1996).
253. See ILR. Conf. Rep. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 31, 43 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 742 and in Hamilton, supra note 224, at 59, 67.
254. Hamilton, supra note 224, at 70.
255. See HLR. Conf. Rep. No. 369, at 46, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 745 and
in Hamilton, supra note 224, at 70.
256. See supra note 194.
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At the moment, the law in this area is in a state of flux. Some court
decisions support the proposition that forward-looking elements of
historical financial information should be entitled to bespeaks-caution
protection. A California court, for example, applied the doctrine to
reject a fraud claim based on an alleged overstatement of accounts
receivable.257 In that case, the California court explained that the
prospectus
specifically warned that "a material portion" of [the company's] ac-
counts were over 90 days old, and that "excessive aging" of these
accounts would adversely affect [the company's] liquidity. Any rea-
sonable investor was able to interpret "excessive aging" as meaning
inability to collect payment, forcing [the company] to take a write-
off. In short, the IPO Prospectus adequately bespoke caution on
the risks concerning [the company's] accounts receivable. -8
Little justification exists for finding the bespeaks-caution doctrine ap-
plicable to such things as accounts receivable or loan loss reserves in a
prospectus, but not applicable when set forth in financial state-
ments.259 The information is, after all, the same.
But prudence would caution against undue optimism as to the pros-
pect of easily convincing the courts. In the past year, the First Cir-
cuit26° and the Third Circuit 261 have each reversed a lower-court
decision applying the bespeaks-caution doctrine to forward-looking
statements about reserves.262 Those decisions at least raise a question
257. In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Cal. 1993), affd in
relevant part, rev'd in part, 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277
(1995).
258. Id. at 862.
259. See Delta Holdings, Inc. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 945 F.2d 1226,
1250 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that "loss reserves are not like a debt with fixed payments
of principal and interest," and that "[i]nformed guesswork is an accepted basis for
determining such reserves"), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992); First Nationwide Bank
v. Gelt Funding, Corp., 820 F. Supp. 89, 95-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[T]he taking of loan
loss reserves is based on managerial guesswork" and is "an inherently speculative and
unreliable measure of actual [losses] because reserves do not represent realized
losses, but rather a contingent estimate of anticipated future losses."), aff'd on other
grounds, 27 F.3d 763 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 728 (1995).
260. Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996).
261. In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996).
262. In In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 832 F. Supp. 948 (W.D. Pa. 1993), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 90 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996), the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania applied the bespeaks-caution doctrine to dismiss a
fraud claim based on a prospectus' alleged misrepresentation that loan loss reserves
"should be adequate to cover future losses that may occur." Id. at 986 (quoting West-
inghouse's prospectus). The district court's treatment of such a statement as forward-
looking, and therefore within the ambit of the bespeaks-caution doctrine, was hardly
unreasonable-as the court noted, loss reserves are "a type of 'soft information,' con-
sisting essentially of predictions about the future performance of receivables." Id. at
970-71. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit-the same court that decided the Trump
case-reversed this aspect of the district court's decision. Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at
710. The rationale was that the cautionary statements did "not sufficiently counter
the alleged misrepresentations, i.e., that the defendants knowingly or recklessly mis-
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as to whether courts might be uneasy about extending the doctrine to
items that are not solely predictive of future events. Whatever the
case, the inclusion of meaningful cautionary language with the for-
ward-looking elements of historical financial statements would help
make clear their inherent uncertainty, even where the bespeaks-cau-
tion doctrine may not technically be applied. But it looks like the
extent to which the bespeaks-caution doctrine is found applicable to
such information will have to await further judicial development.
IV. RISK MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL REPORTING OUTSIDE
THE UNITED STATES
A. Overview
Among the important considerations arising out of computer-trans-
mitted financial information is that, in all likelihood, transmission will
not be confined by the territorial boundaries of the United States.2ca
Even now, the International Accounting Standards Committee 2z is
represented the adequacy of the loan loss reserves and compliance with GAAP." Id.
at 709.
The First Circuit reversed a Massachusetts district court's decision that the be-
speaks-caution doctrine applied to a statement in a prospectus that a company be-
lieved "the remaining restructuring reserve ... is adequate to cover presently planned
restructuring actions." Wilensky v. Digital Equip. Corp., 903 F. Supp. 173, 177
(D. Mass. 1995) (emphasis omitted) (quoting prospectus supplement), affd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996). The
First Circuit recognized that the statement about the "adequacy" of the reserves had
"both a forward-looking aspect and an aspect that encompasses a representation of
present fact." Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1213. The court also noted that the plaintiffs' fraud
claim was not premised upon a forward-looking statement; rather, the plaintiffs al-
leged that the statement about the adequacy of reserves was a misrepresentation of a
present fact, because the defendants allegedly knew that the reserves were in fact
inadequate. Accordingly, the court found that the accompanying cautionary language
did not render the misrepresentation immaterial as a matter of law. Id. at 1213-14.
263. See Wallman, Regulating in a World of Technological and Global Change,
supra note 16, at 64 ("Technology also has had a profound effect on the globalization
of the financial markets. Simply put, the walls between competitors built by geo-
graphic boundaries and time zones which once dictated and furthered nationalistic
views toward commerce are now generally nonexistent."); Wailman, Regulation for a
New World, supra note 1, at 8, 10 ("Nothing is changing more rapidly today than
information technology, and new communications vehicles like the Internet know no
borders. Consequently, the premise of our regulatory framework-controlling infor-
mation flows grounded in a sovereign right based on geographic jurisdiction-be-
comes more tenuous."); see also Glenn Cheney, FEI Panel Warns Risk Management
Will Get Harder, Acct. Today, Nov. 11-24, 1996, at 17, 17 ("Risk is created by the
complexity of doing business in a global world where technology and speed create a
more intense business environment."); Peter Huber, Cyberpower, Forbes, Dec. 2,
1996, at 142, 142 ("Virtual establishments on the Web already offer incorporation in
Belize, bank accounts in Switzerland, currency trading in Germany, brokerage ac-
counts in New Zealand. International 800 numbers are proliferating.").
264. The International Accounting Standards Committee ("IASC") is a private-
sector organization whose members consist of 116 accountancy organizations from 86
countries. The IASC-U.S. Comparison Project: A Report on the Similarities and Dif-
ferences Between IASC Standards and U.S. GAAP 39-41, 49, 74-78 (Carrie Bloomer
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hard at work on formulating international accounting standards and,
with their completion and acceptance,265 the globalization of capital
markets, already underway, 66 may increase exponentially.267 The
world comprises 185 nations that are members of the United Nations
and a handful of non-member nations (such as Switzerland) as well. 268
The international dissemination of financial information over the In-
ternet may give rise to potential liability in any number or all of them.
This section therefore broadens the discussion of risk management
to isolate important procedural and substantive issues arising out of
the dissemination of financial information throughout the world. As a
departure point, the section assumes a New York-based accounting
firm that disseminates false financial information about a New York-
based company throughout the world over the Internet. The conclu-
ed., 1996). "IASC['s] mission is to formulate accounting standards, to promote their
worldwide acceptance and observation, and to work generally for the improvement
and harmonization of accounting regulations, standards, and procedures worldwide."
Id. at 41. IASC's United States members are the AICPA, The Institute of Internal
Auditors, and the Institute of Management Accountants. Id. at 78.
265. IASC's present goal is to develop a core set of international accounting stan-
dards by March 1998. Once those core standards are developed, IASC intends to
present them to the International Organization of Securities Commissions
("IOSCO") to be considered for acceptance by IOSCO members, including the
United States SEC, for cross-border securities listings. The expectation is that the
SEC's acceptance of those standards would result in foreign firms that prepare finan-
cial statements based on IASC standards competing in United States capital markets
with United States firms whose financial statements are based on United States
GAAP. One unresolved question is the extent to which "IASC standards could even-
tually enter the hierarchy of U.S. GAAP for U.S. companies." See id. at 6; see also
Cheney, Cook Defends Independence, supra note 19, at 16 ("Within a year and a half
we'll have ... an assessment of international standards in the U.S., and it's very possi-
ble that the rules of the game could change.").
266. "'Increasingly, you have domestic deals placed overseas, and foreign deals in
the U.S.,' says Mark Seigel, the head of world-wide bond syndication at Morgan Stan-
ley. 'So capital markets, and more particularly new issues, are increasingly global by
nature, which in itself leads to more transactions."' Gregory Zuckerman, Bond Pro-
fessionals Go 'Round-the-Clock, Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1996, at Cl; see also Elizabeth
MacDonald, Universal Accounting Rules Seem Elusive, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1996, at
B9E ("Even with the tough U.S. accounting rules, the number of foreign companies
listing on the Big Board has nearly tripled in the last five years to 285 today. Since
1990, the number of foreign companies registering with the SEC has risen to 856 from
434.").
267. Congress has recently demonstrated a fairly strong interest in the facilitation
of global capital markets through the standardization of international accounting
standards. Section 509(3) of the recently-enacted National Securities Markets Im-
provement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3449-50 (1996), provides
that "establishment of a high-quality comprehensive set of generally accepted interna-
tional accounting standards in cross-border securities offerings would greatly facilitate
international financing activities." Id. § 509(3). Pursuant to the Act, the SEC is to
report to Congress on progress in the development of international accounting stan-
dards "not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act," i.e., by October
1997. Id. § 509(5). See generally SEC Must Report on Writing of Core International
Accounting Standards, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1360 (Nov. 1, 1996)
(discussing the obligations under and ramifications of section 509 of the Act).
268. 1 The Europa World Y.B. 1996, at 3-4 (Europa Publications Ltd.).
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sion is that, while the prospect of world-wide litigation is intimidating,
it is also manageable. The issues addressed are: (1) the jurisdiction of
foreign courts over the accounting firm; (2) the law the foreign court
may apply; (3) procedural issues of strategic significance in foreign
courts (class actions, contingent fees, fee-shifting, jury trials, punitive
damages); (4) the elements of the substantive accountant liability
claim in foreign courts; (5) the enforcement of foreign judgments in
United States courts; and (6) the effectiveness of arbitration, forum
selection, and loss-limiting clauses in international agreements. 269
B. The Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts
The first step in assessing international risk management is to recog-
nize that the international dissemination of false financial information
may indeed expose a United States accounting firm to litigation and
liability in foreign courts.
International law on the point is fairly straightforward. As a gen-
eral matter, international law recognizes the ability of foreign nations
to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents where the assertion of jurisdic-
tion under the particular circumstances would be "reasonable. ''vO
The criteria for "reasonableness" are roughly analogous to the criteria
used in the various "long-arm" statutes within the United States to
address when, for example, a court of one state may assert jurisdiction
over the resident of another."7' In the international context, a foreign
court may be "reasonable" in asserting judicial jurisdiction over a
nonresident person where (among other things)-
* the person regularly carries on business in the foreign
state;
• the person carried on activity in the foreign state (but only
in respect of such activity);
269. One caveat is in order. This discussion does not seek to set forth all law appli-
cable to the international dissemination of financial information in each of the nations
of the world. Nor would such a discussion make sense-simply understanding the
laws of the United States requires individual consideration of both federal law and the
law of each of the fifty states (plus territories). What this section does seek to do is to
identify important issues that may be encountered in foreign courts and their poten-
tial significance to international risk management.
270. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 421(1) (1987) [hereinafter Foreign Relations Restatement] ("A state may exercise
jurisdiction through its courts to adjudicate with respect to a person or thing if the
relationship of the state to the person or thing is such as to make the exercise of
jurisdiction reasonable."). See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litiga-
tion and Arbitration 147 (1993) [hereinafter Lowenfeld, International Arbitration]
(discussing generally the subject of a foreign court's "jurisdiction to adjudicate").
271. Compare Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 270, § 421(2) with N.Y.
Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 302 (McKinney 1995) ("Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-
domiciliaries").
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* the person carried on outside the foreign state an activity
having a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within
the foreign state (but only in respect of such activity); or
* the thing that is the subject of adjudication is owned, pos-
sessed, or used in the foreign state (but only in respect of a
claim reasonably connected with that thing)."T2
It is certainly foreseeable that a foreign court would find it reason-
able under these criteria to assert jurisdiction over a United States
accounting firm disseminating financial information internationally
over the Internet17 3 The court might find that such dissemination
constituted "business in the state" or "activity in the state" or activity
272. Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 270, § 421(2)(h)-(k).
To put aside a potential issue, a foreign court ought not to assert jurisdiction over a
United States-based accounting firm based exclusively on the activities of the United
States firm's affiliate within the foreign court's nation. Courts-at least courts in the
United States-have repeatedly declined to uphold personal jurisdiction under analo-
gous circumstances. See Young v. Jones, 816 F. Supp. 1070, 1075-77 (D.S.C. 1992),
aff'd sub nom. Young v. FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180 (4th Cir. 1997); Flair Resources Ltd. v.
Peat Marwick Int'l, No. 87-105-RE, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17481 (D. Or. Feb. 8,
1988), aff'd, 891 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1989); Reingold v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 599 F.
Supp. 1241, 1253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Cocklereece v. Moran, 500 F. Supp. 487, 489
(N.D. Ga. 1980); Express One Int'l, Inc. v. Certified Dive Travel, Inc., No. 93-
19297(18) (Fla. Mar. 21, 1996); Hotel Partners v. Streit, No. 90-08081-M (Tex. Aug. 7,
1991).
273. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Some-
one.., who employs a computer network service like CompuServe to market a prod-
uct can reasonably expect disputes with that service to yield lawsuits in the service's
home state."); Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D.
Conn. 1996) ("The court concludes that advertising via the Internet is solicitation of a
sufficient repetitive nature to satisfy... the Connecticut long-arm statute.., thereby
conferring Connecticut's long-arm jurisdiction.... ."); Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.,
947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996) ("[T]he Court concludes that defendant
CyberGold, through its internet activities, has purposefully availed itself of the privi-
lege of doing business with this forum such that it could reasonably anticipate the
possibility of being ha[u]led into court here."); Susan J. Kohlmann & Kerry A. Bren-
nan, Internet: Electronic Contacts May Lead to Court, Metropolitan Corp. Couns.,
Oct. 1996, at 8, 8 (reviewing CompuServe decision); David E. Rovella, Internet Use
Can Confer Jurisdiction, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 12, 1996, at Bi (same). But see Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In finding that the estab-
lishment of a Web site did not confer jurisdiction, a New York district court stated:
As set forth above, King has done nothing to purposefully avail himself of
the benefits of New York. King, like numerous others, simply created a Web
site and permitted anyone who could find it to access it. Creating a site, like
placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide-or
even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed
toward the forum state. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 112, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1032, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1992) (plurality opin-
ion). There are no allegations that King actively sought to encourage New
Yorkers to access his site, or that he conducted any business-let alone a
continuous and systematic part of its business-in New York. There is in
fact no suggestion that King has any presence of any kind in New York other
than the Web site that can be accessed worldwide. Bensusan's argument
that King should have foreseen that users could access the site in New York
and be confused as to the relationship of the two Blue Note clubs is insuffi-
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outside the state with a "substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect
within the state."'274
For purpose of risk management, therefore, prudence would mili-
tate strongly in favor of an assumption that the international dissemi-
nation of financial information via computer would subject a United
States accounting firm to the jurisdiction of foreign courts.
C. The Nation's Law to Be Applied
Assuming such jurisdiction, the question then arises: what nation's
law would the foreign court apply? In the language of international
law, this issue involves the foreign nation's "jurisdiction to pre-
scribe"-the extent to which the foreign nation would have the "juris-
diction to prescribe" the applicability of its own law.2 75 In the context
of a United States firm's dissemination of financial information into a
foreign nation, a foreign court would face two bodies of potentially
cient to satisfy due process. See [Fox v. Boudier], 794 F.2d at 37; Beckett v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 893 F. Supp. 234, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Although CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). a
recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
reached a different result, it was based on vastly different facts. In that case,
the Sixth Circuit found personal jurisdiction proper in Ohio over an Internet
user from Texas who subscribed to a network service based in Ohio. The
user, however, specifically targeted Ohio by subscribing to the service and
entering into a separate agreement with the service to sell his software over
the Internet. Furthermore, he advertised his software through the service
and repeatedly sent his software to the service in Ohio. Il at 1264-65. This
led that court to conclude that the Internet user "reached out" from Texas to
Ohio and "originated and maintained" contacts with Ohio. Id. at 1266. This
action, on the other hand, contains no allegations that King in any way di-
rected any contact to, or had any contact with, New York or intended to
avail itself of any of New York's benefits.
Accordingly, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over King in this case
would violate the protections of the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 301 (footnote omitted). The court noted that "[in CompuServe, the Sixth Cir-
cuit explicitly wrote that it was not addressing the issue of whether the Internet user
'would be subject to suit in any state where his software was purchased or used .... '"
IL at 301 n.3 (quoting CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1268); see Paul M. Barrett, Suit Involv-
ing Internet Site Is Dismissed, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1996, at B10 (discussing the Ben-
susan decision).
274. Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 270, § 421(2)(h)-(j). See generally
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness 82(1994) [hereinafter Lowenfeld, The Quest for Reasonableness] ("If I rent a car here
in The Hague and run down a pedestrian crossing the Mauritskade, there can be no
doubt that the court in The Hague will have jurisdiction in a civil claim for damages
against me arising out of the accident, even if I am long back in New York .... ");
Linda J. Silberman, Judicial Jurisdiction in the Conflict of Laws Course: Adding a
Comparative Dimension, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 389, 396-400 (1995) (providing two
examples of foreign countries' grounds for establishing "specific jurisdiction": Eng-
land's Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, and the European Community's
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments).
275. See Lowenfeld, International Arbitration, supra note 270, at 46.
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applicable law: the law of the foreign nation and the law of the
United States.276
Here, again, an analogy may be drawn to the principles of law ap-
plied by United States courts in seeking to determine which state's law
should control a dispute between citizens of different states.277 Gen-
erally, international law will recognize a nation's jurisdiction to pre-
scribe its own law with respect to such things as-
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place
within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within
its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory; [and]
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals
outside as well as within its territory.278
United States lawyers are fully aware of the difficulty of determin-
ing the applicable law in disputes between residents of different
states;279 suffice it to say that the task becomes no easier in disputes
between citizens of different nations.28° The prudent assumption
would be that, depending on the circumstances, it is entirely possible
that a foreign court would find that it had jurisdiction to prescribe the
applicability of its own nation's law to the United States firm's
activity.
For example, the dissemination into a nation of false financial infor-
mation may be found to constitute conduct that "takes place within
[the foreign nation's] territory" or that constitutes "conduct outside
[the foreign nation's] territory that has or is intended to have substan-
tial effect within its territory."'' Under traditional choice-of-law
principles, it is well established that the place in which a person relies
upon false information may be significant in determining the law ap-
plicable to the person's claim.28 Indeed, an analogy might be drawn
276. The lack of any governing treaties is discussed infra part N.E.
277. See generally Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws (2d
ed. 1980).
278. Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 270, § 402.
279. See William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959, 971 (1953)("The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires,
and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious mat-
ters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite
lost when engulfed and entangled in it."), quoted in Weintraub, supra note 277, at 3.
280. See Ebke, supra note 144, at 698 ("[T]he choice of law principles in cases of
auditors' liability are rather blurred and far from uniform.").
281. See Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 270, § 402; see also id. § 402
cmt. d (stating that "[jjurisdiction with respect to activity outside the state, but having
or intended to have substantial effect within the state's territory," may be sufficient to
give a foreign nation jurisdiction to prescribe).
282. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 148 (1971); see also Rhode
Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, 455 F.2d 847, 851 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding that
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to the international dissemination of a false statement giving rise to a
claim for libel. There is little question in such an instance as to the
power of a foreign nation to apply its own law.3
That is not to say that the law applicable in the United States would
never apply in a foreign court. For example, a United States account-
ing firm's international dissemination of false information upon which
a foreign citizen relies to invest United States funds in United States
securities would not necessarily justify the application of the foreign
nation's law. In such an instance, the contacts with the United States
may be sufficiently prevalent that the foreign court would decide that
United States law should control.
Even where United States law is found applicable by a foreign
court, however, it is not clear that all United States law would be
treated equally. Most notably, it is doubtful that a foreign court
would apply the Securities Act of 19331- or the Securities Exchange
Act of 19341 (the latter of which provides the authority for Rule 10b-
5). The United States securities acts are "public law" (law that
takes on governmental enforcement overtones) and, as a general mat-
ter, foreign courts are reluctant to apply the public law of a foreign
state. 7 Over time, this tradition against the international enforce-
ment of public law may break down.3 At present, though, even
where United States law is found to apply, the securities acts may not.
Ultimately, this area of international law, like its domestic counter-
part, is "highly controversial" and "leaves considerable room for the
where "reliance on [statements] and subsequent injury took place" in Rhode Island,
"[u]nder such circumstances... the law of Rhode Island governs" (citation omitted)).
283. See Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 270, § 402 CmL d ("The effects
principle is not controversial with respect to acts such as shooting or even sending
libelous publications across a boundary."); cf. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148
F.2d 416,444 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Both agreements would clearly have been unlawful, had
they been made within the United States; ... both were unlawful, though made
abroad, if they were intended to affect imports and did affect them."). See generally
Lowenfeld, International Arbitration, supra note 270, at 46 (discussing the concept of
"jurisdiction to prescribe," which "explore[s] the extent and limits of the reach of a
nation's laws").
284. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-11 (1994).
285. Id. § 78a-11.
286. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
287. See, e.g., Schemmer v. Property Resources Ltd., [1975] Ch. 273. In Schemmer,
the court stated-
The 1934 Act is ... a penal law of the United States of America and, as such,
unenforceable in [English] courts.... [I]t was passed for public ends...
enacted not merely in the interest of the nation as an abstract or political
entity, but to protect a class of the public.... [I]n the absence of specific
legislation founded on treaties, preventive criminal justice is no more a
proper subject of international enforcement than retributive criminal justice.
Id. See generally Lowenfeld, The Quest for Reasonableness, supra note 274, at 30
("States don't apply the public law of other States.").
288. See Lowenfeld, The Quest for Reasonableness, supra note 274, at 171-72.
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skilled advocate." '289 The important point is to recognize the distinct
possibility, if not likelihood, that United States accounting firms
forced to litigate in foreign courts will find their liability determined as
a matter of foreign law.
D. Aspects of Foreign Procedure
None of this is to suggest, however, that a United States accounting
firm potentially subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign court and to
foreign law is necessarily at greater financial risk than in a court in the
United States. In fact, some aspects of foreign law and procedure may
make a foreign court more attractive than a court at home.
One such aspect is the general unavailability of class actions outside
the United States. As a general matter, class actions may not be com-
menced under the laws of foreign nations.29 ° That is not to say that
class actions do not exist anywhere-for example, three provinces in
Canada (British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec) have some form of
class action legislation,291 as does Australia. But, on the whole, class
action procedural mechanisms outside the United States are almost
nonexistent.
This unavailability of class action litigation is significant because, in
the absence of class action mechanisms, the economics of investor liti-
gation may substantially impede the successful prosecution of a claim.
A study by the Toronto Stock Exchange illustrates the difficulty.292
The Toronto study, in assessing the viability of investor claims under
present Canadian law, observed that, in the absence of an effective
class action procedure, "[u]nless an investor suffered a very large loss
• .. it would not be economically rational for the investor to. com-
mence an action against those believed to be responsible, even if a
sound basis in law existed for pursuing such a claim. ' 29 3 One conse-
quence for Canada, according to the Toronto study, is that "the reme-
dies available to investors in secondary trading markets who are
injured by misleading disclosure are so difficult to pursue and to es-
tablish that they are, as a practical matter, largely academic. '294 The
solution? "[T]he Committee believes that statutory civil liability for
misleading disclosure would be a meaningful enforcement mechanism
or deterrent, and a realistic means of compensating injured investors,
only in the context of viable class actions. '295 The study's recognition
of the importance of class action litigation to the protection of inves-
289. Lowenfeld, International Arbitration, supra note 270, at 46.
290. See, e.g., Ebke, supra note 144, at 705 (in the context of German law).
291. See The Toronto Stock Exchange, Toward Improved Disclosure: A Search for
Balance in Corporate Disclosure 45 (Dec. 1995) [hereinafter Toronto Exchange
Report].
292. See id. at 44-50.
293. Id at 45.
294. Ia at iv.
295. Ida at 45.
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tors does not mean that Canada is prepared to plunge headlong into
United States class action-type practice-far from it. But the conclu-
sions of the Toronto study illustrate the importance of class action
procedures to the prosecution of foreign investor claims.
The general absence of class actions in foreign courts is accompa-
nied by another aspect of foreign law that can operate to the advan-
tage of defendants-the absence of contingent fees. Indeed, in some
countries (England and Germany, for example) contingent fees are
considered unethical and are illegal.2 9 6 Here, too, it is not the case
that contingent fees are not available anywhere-it may be, for exam-
ple, that some form of contingent fee is available in British Columbia
and several of the Australian states. But, in the overwhelming
number of nations, contingent fees are not available at all.291
Not only are contingent fees not available in most nations; some
nations require "fee-shifting" pursuant to which the loser must pay
the winner's legal fees.2 98 As to fee-shifting, the law outside the
United States is not nearly as uniform as with regard to the absence of
contingent fees. England and most Canadian provinces, for example,
require fee-shifting; France does not; and Germany requires fee-shift-
ing, but based on a schedule that is substantially behind the economics
of present-day litigation. 99 Where it exists, fee-shifting imposes still
another impediment to the prosecution of a claim based on the dis-
semination of false financial information.0 0
Still another procedural consideration is that, in accountant liability
cases outside the United States, jury trials are for the most part un-
available.30 ' Isolated exceptions could exist; hypothetically, a plaintiff
might end up with a jury trial where civil and criminal claims hap-
pened to be combined. It is safe to assume, though, that a United
States accounting firm facing claims in foreign courts based on false
financial information will almost always have its liability determined
by a judge or panel of judges, not a jury.302
296. See Ebke, supra note 144, at 687, 705 (England and Germany, respectively);
Bernhard Grossfeld & Werner Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation: A Com-
parative View of Corporate Power in the United States and Europe, 26 Am. J. Comp. L
397, 419 (1978); Hans Smit, The Explosion in International Litigation, Metropolitan
Corp. Couns., Oct. 1996, at 59, 59 ("[C]ontingency fee arrangements ... are largely
forbidden abroad.").
297. See Eugene J. Silva, Practical Views on Stemming the Tide of Foreign Plaintiffs
and Concluding Mid-Atlantic Settlements, 28 Tex. Int'l LJ. 479, 480 n.4 (1993) (citing
examples); see also Rudolph B. Schlesinger et al., Comparative Law: Cases-Text-
Materials 352-54 (5th ed. 1988).
298. See Smit, supra note 296, at 59.
299. See Ebke, supra note 144, at 687, 704-05.
300. See Toronto Exchange Report, supra note 291, at 44-46.
301. See Smit, supra note 296, at 59 ("[A] foreign forum may be selected because it
has no jury in civil cases . . ").
302. Cf. Ebke, supra note 144, at 688-89.
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And a judge or judges in the foreign court will not have the same
discretion to award damages for egregious conduct as a jury in the
United States, because punitive damages are almost never available in
accountant liability cases in foreign courts.3 °3 Indeed, outside the
United States punitive damages are frowned upon and, in some na-
tions, explicitly against public policy.3°4 In a recent case, the German
Supreme Court would not even enforce the punitive damage compo-
nent of a United States judgment. °5
All of these aspects of foreign law and procedure can make foreign
prosecution of investor claims against a United States accounting firm
exceedingly difficult. Such an investor cannot enjoy the benefit of
class action representative status; he cannot finance the litigation
through a contingent fee; he cannot look forward to a run-away jury
award; he has no realistic hope of punitive damages; and, if he loses,
he may find himself having to pay not only his own costs but the costs
of the defendant accounting firm. It is small wonder that the Toronto
303. See Smit, supra note 296, at 59.
304. See generally Hans Stoll, Consequences of Liability: Remedies, in 11 Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Torts §§ 8-107 to -116 (Andrd Tunc ed.,
1983) (comparing the role of "exemplary damages" in English and American law, as
well as in other countries' legal systems). In discussing punitive damages under Eng-
lish law, for example, one commentator has observed:
In ENGLAND exemplary damages have never played the same role as in
the UNITED STATES. Recently the House of Lords sharply curtailed the
whole institution in the case of Rookes v. Barnard .... In this case Lord
Devlin observed at the outset that the House of Lords had never approved
an award of exemplary damages. However, in Lord Devlin's view, this legal
institution could not be completely abandoned in light of the fact that it had
been theretofore employed by the courts and recognized in various statutes.
Yet he emphasized that, except for the cases governed by statute, exemplary
damages should be awarded only in two special situations. The first involves
arbitrary excess of state authority. Depending upon the circumstances, it
may be proper to give the particular state official a reminder in the form of
exemplary damages. The second situation concerns a wrongdoer's willing-
ness to assume the risk of liability in view of the prospect of benefits exceed-
ing the loss. In this case the award should be assessed so as to foil the
tortfeasor's calculation. Finally, the severe remedy of exemplary damages,
in any event, should be invoked only if the award of compensatory damages
does not adequately sanction the tortfeasor's misdeed.
It appears that these limitations imposed by ENGLISH law reduce exem-
plary damages to virtual insignificance.
Id. § 8-112 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted); see also Lowenfeld, The Quest for
Reasonableness, supra note 274, at 187-89 (comparing the American tradition of
awarding civil punitive damages to German law's refusal to do so).
305. See G.D.S. v. E.S., 118 BGHZ 312, 312-13 (Bundesgerichshof IX Civ. Sen. 4
June 1992) (translation: "A United States judgment of punitive damages in a not-
inconsiderable amount that is granted along with an award of damages for material
and immaterial injury cannot, in Germany in the regular course, be declared enforce-
able."); see also Lowenfeld, The Quest for Reasonableness, supra note 274, at 187
(discussing the G.D.S. decision and its merits in light of other alternatives); Harald
Koch & Joachim Zekoll, Zweimal amerikanische 'punitive damages' vor deutschen
Gerichten, IPRax, No. 5, 288 (1993) (discussing the treatment of American courts'
awards of punitive damages in German enforcement actions).
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Stock Exchange concluded that "a statutory provision for civil liability
for misleading continuous disclosure would have little effect without
provision for class actions."3"
None of this, it bears mention, is fixed in stone. If anything, there
may be an awareness on the part of commercially-developed nations
that, with all its problems, United States class action and other pro-
investor legal mechanisms enhance the quality of disclosure and
thereby the efficiency of United States capital markets.307 It is possi-
ble, therefore, that commercially-developed nations will show an in-
creased willingness to consider such possibilities as class actions and
contingent fees. Still, the disadvantages of the United States approach
are plain for all to see. While recognizing the potential benefits of
class action litigation, the Toronto study, for example, is keenly sensi-
tive to the need to make sure that any such procedures adopted in
Canada "are sufficiently different from those in the United States that
there is no practical risk that the establishment of statutory civil liabil-
ity in Canada will give rise to 'strike suit' litigation in Canada."'' m
E. The Substantive Claim in Foreign Courts
There is no treaty to which the United States is a party that would
determine the substantive elements of a claim against an accounting
firm for a failure to adhere to professional standards. That is not to
say that treaties regarding the liability of accountants have not been
attempted. The European Economic Community ("EEC"), for exam-
ple, in 1972 issued a draft directive that would have provided some
uniform standards applicable to accountant litigation. -09 That effort,
however, failed. The present consensus in Europe seems to be that
the laws of the member nations, rather than EEC law, should establish
the standards pursuant to which liability upon accountants should be
imposed. 10
As to the standards of liability themselves, even without a treaty
they tend to be fairly consistent, both with each other and with stan-
dards in the United States. They typically can be expected to involve
a breach of the standard of professional care (either through negli-
gence, gross negligence, recklessness, or by intent) resulting in a false
statement upon which someone justifiably relies thereby suffering
306. Toronto Exchange Report, supra note 291, at 44. See generally Ebke, supra
note 144, at 687-89, 704-05 (comparing accountant liability in the United States to that
in Germany).
307. See Toronto Exchange Report, supra note 291, at 21-22.
308. Id. at iv.
309. See 1972 OJ. (C 131) 49; 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) J 1401 (1983).
310. See 1983 O.J. (C 240) 2, discussed in Ebke, supra note 144, at 666-67. See gen-
erally Werner F. Ebke & Dirk Struckmeier, The Civil Liability of Corporate Auditors:
An International Perspective 25-26 (1994) (describing the failed attempts to unify the
laws regarding accountant liability in the European Union).
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harm.3 1' Not all nations go as far as the United States in allowing
recovery from an accountant based on mere negligence. Thus, Ger-
many, for example-which "has probably the most conservative body
of law in this regard"-appears to limit accountant liability to in-
stances of either intentional misconduct or gross negligence. 12 Still,
the basic elements are the same.
An issue that tends to bedevil the commercially-developed nations,
just as it does the United States, is the class of potential plaintiffs that
should be permitted to file a claim.31 3 Somewhat surprisingly, given
the less litigious nature of non-U.S. societies, some commercially-de-
veloped countries (e.g., France, Italy, Switzerland) ostensibly apply a
"foreseeability" rule-the rule that permits any foreseeable user of
the financial information to sue.314 This is more liberal than the rule
generally followed in the United States, where either the conservative
Ultramares rule3"5 or the middle-ground "limited group" rule of the
Restatement 316 are the overwhelming favorites.317 In the United
States, the foreseeability rule now applies in only two states.31 8
The broader acceptance of the foreseeability rule outside the
United States may not, however, reflect a more expansive view of an
accountant's responsibility as much as the fact that other nations, ow-
ing to the procedural impediments to a claim discussed above, have
had much less experience with run-away accountants' litigation than
the United States. That lack of experience is important, because it is a
311. Ebke, supra note 144, at 665-66.
312. Ebke & Struckmeier, supra note 310, at 27-29, 39.
313. A German scholar has observed:
The question of accountants' liability to third parties is now a favorite sub-
ject in the law of both common law and civil law countries. The United
States has perhaps the most advanced body of law in this area. The develop-
ment of the law in other English-speaking jurisdictions, such as England,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, has been, however, by
no means less vital. In Japan, too, there is considerable discussion of the
subject. In Western Europe, the law of the independent auditor's liability to
third parties is currently in an evolving and experimental phase. The law in
some countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, allows recovery
only if the auditor acted with the intent to mislead the third person. How-
ever, the law of other countries, such as France, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland, is, at least as far as substantive rules are concerned, more
favorable to the injured third party, although the number of cases that have
been tried under these laws is very small.
Ebke, supra note 144, at 665-66 (footnotes omitted).
314. See Ebke & Struckmeier, supra note 310, at 29-31; Ebke, supra note 144, at
666. But see Caparo Indus. PLC v. Dickman, [1990] 2 W.L.R. 358, 1 All E.R. 568
(appeal taken from Q.B.) (refusing to impose liability on accountants unless plaintiff
could prove accountants knew of the plaintiff and its reliance for a specific purpose).
315. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
316. Torts Restatement, supra note 34, § 552(1).
317. These different rules regarding who may sue are discussed supra part II.C.
318. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 318-24




natural inclination of courts in fashioning the rules of professional lia-
bility to borrow concepts (such as foreseeability) from the personal
injury area in which tort law has its roots. It takes substantial experi-
ence with accountant liability claims (or at least heroic foresight) to
recognize that, in the area of accountants' liability, a foreseeability
standard simply does not work. The ostensible acceptance of a fore-
seeability standard may simply reflect that non-U.S. courts are some-
what behind in the learning (or at least experience) curve.
The issue of precisely who may sue an accounting firm is worthy of
attention in the context of Internet-disseminated financial informa-
tion 19 because United States courts, in essentially exempting dissemi-
nators of information over the public media from liability for
negligence, have relied upon the Restatement's middle-ground rule to
conclude that users of the public media are not part of a "limited
group" and therefore are not entitled to state a claim.320 It is not clear
that that rationale would hold up where a court were seriously com-
mitted to the foreseeability standard. Somewhat ominously, German
courts-though generally conservative as to accountant liability-
have shown an inclination to impose non-fraud liability on rating
agencies, such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's.32' That is an impo-
sition of liability with which United States courts, with their strong
tradition of protecting the First Amendment freedom of speech,
would probably disagree.3z
Exactly how far foreign courts might go in permitting claims based
upon Internet-disseminated financial information is difficult to dis-
cern, at least based on the law as presently developed, simply because
the law outside the United States has not developed very far. In Ja-
pan, Spain, and Sweden, for example, there are virtually no cases that
come anywhere close to the area. Even in those nations where courts
have addressed the issue, moreover, the resulting rule is not always
clear. 3Y In England, the High Court of Justice has recently issued a
decision permitting Lloyd's "names" to sue Ernst & Young, thereby
319. See discussion supra parts LB-C.
320. See, e.g., First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 670 F. Supp. 115, 117-
18 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussed supra part LC).
321. Carsten Thomas Ebenroth & Thomas Daum, Die rechtlichen Aspekte des Rat-
ings von Emittenten und Emissionen, 5 Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (Oct. 1992).
322. See First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's, 869 F.2d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 1989)
("[T]he First Amendment require[s] appellants to demonstrate that [Standard &
Poor's] had published the allegedly false summary [with malice] .... "). See generally
discussion supra part I.E. The SEC, in contrast, would probably feel more at home in
Germany. The recent tidal wave of investor information onto the Internet may be
causing the SEC to take a harder look at those whose media status has historically
resulted in First Amendment protection. See Taylor, supra note 20, at C14 ("[T]he
SEC has filed many media-related cases lately, including at least one newsletter case,
a radio case and five involving the Internet .... ").
323. See Ebke & Struckmeier, supra note 310, at 26 ("The law of the member states
of the European Union concerning the independent auditors' liability to third parties
is still in an evolving and experimental phase.").
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throwing into uncertainty what was previously viewed as a fairly con-
servative body of law.324 The decision itself is not a model of clarity.
It runs for more than 400 pages.3z
It is important, though, not to lose sight of the procedural impedi-
ments to prosecution of an accountant liability claim, which would ap-
ply every bit as much to a claim premised on foreseeability as to a
claim premised on a stricter standard. In France and Switzerland,
both of which appear to apply a foreseeability standard, one article
has thus observed that "the procedural difficulties to demonstrate and
prove the necessary elements of a liability action against an auditor
and the financial risk of bringing a law suit seem to have shielded
auditors from litigation on a large scale., 326 It is the procedural im-
pediments, more than the substantive claim, that distinguish foreign
accountant liability litigation from its United States counterpart.
In the end, it may be that the relative lack of litigiousness outside
the United States, accompanied by a more conservative approach to
accountant liability generally, would lead foreign courts to reject a
standard of liability, which, in essence, would make accountants po-
tentially liable to an indeterminate class of Internet users. That may
particularly be the case if the United States, with its long history of
expansive accountant liability, itself draws a line in the sand that even
United States courts are not prepared to cross.
F. Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment
It is not enough for a foreign plaintiff, seeking to recover invest-
ment or credit losses, to obtain a judgment against a United States
accounting firm in a foreign court. That judgment, if it is to do the
foreign plaintiff any good, must then be enforced. To the extent en-
forcement seeks assets located in the United States, the foreign plain-
tiff will ordinarily have to resort to a proceeding in United States
courts.
Thus it happens that the United States judicial system will fre-
quently play a critical role even in cases adjudicated entirely outside
of the United States. A question immediately leaps to mind: If the
accounting firm loses in a foreign court, will it get a second opportu-
324. See Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd., 1992 Folio 1496 (Oct. 31, 1995).
Compare Caparo Indus. PLC v. Dickman, [1990] 2 W.L.R. 358, 1 All E.R. 568 (appeal
taken from Q.B.) (judgment by Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle) ("[F]oreseeability of
likely harm is not in itself a sufficient test of liability in negligence."); James Mc-
Naughton Papers Group Ltd. v. Hicks Anderson & Co., [1991] 2 W.L.R. 641, 1 All
E.R. 134 (C.A.) (following Caparo reasoning) and Morgan Crucible Co. PLC v. Hill
Samuel Bank Ltd., [1991] 2 W.L.R. 655, 1 All E.R. 148 (C.A. 1990) (same). See gener-
ally Ebke & Struckmeier, supra note 310, at 17-19 (discussing, prior to Henderson, the
Caparo ruling and its implications).
325. See Henderson, 1992 Folio 1496.
326. Ebke & Struckmeier, supra note 310, at 31.
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nity to present its defense when the foreign plaintiff seeks to enforce
the foreign judgment in a court in the United States?
The answer is: probably not. In the United States, foreign judg-
ments are enforced as a matter of course. While Congress has not
exercised its power to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of
foreign court judgments, many states (such as New York) have
adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act,327
which specifically recognizes the validity of foreign judgments and
makes available to foreign plaintiffs streamlined procedures to see
that justice, as determined by the foreign court, is swiftly carried
out.328 In New York, for example, enforcement of a foreign judgment
may be sought by filing a motion for summary judgment in lieu of a
complaint. 329
But it is not always so easy. The Uniform Foreign Money-Judg-
ments Recognition Act calls into question the enforceability of a for-
eign judgment that was obtained under circumstances potentially
violative of fundamental notions of fair play and justice.330 For exam-
ple, New York law calls into question a foreign judgment: where the
judgment was rendered under a system that does not provide "tribu-
nals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process";
where the foreign court "did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant"; where the foreign court "did not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter"; where the defendant "did not receive notice";
where the judgment was "obtained by fraud"; or where the underlying
cause of action "is repugnant to the public policy of this state."'331
Five years ago, the potential significance of these protections was
vividly illustrated in Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc.332 In
that case, a lower New York state court declined to enforce a judg-
ment entered by an English court in a libel action brought by an In-
dian national against the New York operator of a news service. 333 The
327. 13 U.L.A. 265 (1986); see also N.Y. Civ. Prac. L & R. §§ 5301-5309 (McKin-
ney 1995) (sections spanning Article 53 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules,
entitled "Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments"). See generally 6 Jack B.
Weinstein et al., New York Civil Practice: CPLR 53-1 to -34 (1996) (discussing N.Y.
Civ. Prac. L. & R. Article 53).
328. See generally Briane N. Mitchell, Foreign Judgments, litig., Summer 1996, at
43 (discussing the uniform act along with related issues of jurisdiction and public pol-
icy defenses).
329. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 5303 (McKinney 1995).
330. See Weinstein et al., supra note 327, at 53-17 to -22 (discussing New York's
application of this requirement); see also Mitchell, supra note 328, at 44-45 (discussing
the high standard required to invalidate a foreign judgment on the basis of proceed-
ings that might implicate due process concerns).
331. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 5304 (McKinney 1995). See generally Mitchell, supra
note 328, at 44-45 (providing examples where due process implications factored into
the decision of whether to disregard a foreign judgment, and concluding that only in
rare instances will such arguments prevail).




court refused to enforce the judgment based on key differences be-
tween the libel law of the United States and the libel law of England,
the latter of which, the court found, did not provide free speech pro-
tections adequate under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.334 The court stated:
[I]f, as claimed by defendant, the public policy to which the foreignjudgment is repugnant is embodied in the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution or the free speech guaranty of the Con-
stitution of this State, the refusal to recognize the judgment should
be, and it is deemed to be, "constitutionally mandatory. 335
The court based its decision upon the provisions of New York proce-
dural law that may preclude recognition of a foreign judgment if the
procedures employed were not "compatible with the requirements of
due process of law" or if the underlying cause of action "is repugnant
to the public policy of this state. 336
This New York decision is not irrelevant to foreign liability arising
out of Internet-disseminated financial information, insofar as an un-
derlying principle in fashioning liability in the United States may be
the applicability of First Amendment protection.337 It is conceivable,
therefore, that a foreign judgment premised on misrepresentation
claims more lenient than under United States law would be of ques-
tionable enforceability in United States courts.
While that is conceivable, however, it does not seem terribly likely.
As a matter of international law, the Bachchan decision has been de-
scribed as possessing "serious flaws."'338 And, in fact, an argument can
be made that the case was wrongly decided. While that view is not
universal, it is demonstrably true that the Bachchan case involved
facts that were nothing short of compelling-a claim by a foreign na-
tional against a United States news operator that directly invaded the
core of First Amendment protections. The enforcement of a judg-
ment against an accounting firm based on the international dissemina-
tion of false financial information is less likely to be perceived as
invading the core of the freedom of speech.339
334. Id. at 665.
335. Id. at 662.
336. IdL; see N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 5304 (McKinney 1995).
337. See Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Civ. Ct. 1987) (discussed
supra part I.E).
338. Jeremy Maltby, Juggling Comity and Self-Government: The Enforcement of
Foreign Libel Judgments in U.S. Courts, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1978, 1981-82 (1994).
339. See generally Charles Platto & William G. Horton, Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Worldwide (2d ed. 1993) (setting forth the requirements for enforcing a
foreign judgment in more than 35 jurisdictions around the world).
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G. Arbitration Agreements, Forum Selection Clauses, and Other
Contractual Means to Control Risk
As in the United States, those uncomfortable with the uncertainty
inherent in international litigation may desire to minimize that uncer-
tainty through contract. In particular, the uncertainty of international
litigation can be mitigated through arbitration agreements, forum se-
lection clauses, and contractual provisions that operate to place pa-
rameters on available damages in the event of a dispute.1 0
Probably among the most desirable means of mitigating the uncer-
tainty of international disputes is the inclusion in international con-
tracts of an arbitration clause. A well-drafted international
arbitration clause will typically provide for the place of arbitration, the
subjects to be arbitrated, the manner of selecting the arbitrators, the
administering institution,31 the rules under which the arbitration is to
be governed, and the nation's law to be applicable to the dispute. 3 2
Such an arbitration clause has many benefits. One is that, in virtu-
ally all commercially-developed nations, arbitral awards are "easy to
enforce. '3" 3 Indeed, as of August 1992, some eighty-nine nations, in-
cluding nearly all major commercial nations, had become parties to
the so-called "New York Convention," the fundamental purpose of
which was to make arbitral awards enforceable among citizens of na-
tions that are parties to the convention. 3 " Another benefit to an arbi-
tration clause is that it makes the law applicable to any dispute a
340. See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 615 (1985) ("The mere appearance of an antitrust dispute does not alone
warrant invalidation of the selected forum on the undemonstrated assumption that
the arbitration clause is tainted."); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20
(1974) ("For all these reasons we hold that the agreement of the parties in this case to
arbitrate any dispute arising out of their international commercial transaction is to be
respected and enforced by the federal courts in accord with the explicit provisions of
the Arbitration Act."); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) ("Thus,
in the light of present-day commercial realities and expanding international trade we
conclude that the forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should
be set aside."); Lowenfeld, International Arbitration, supra note 270, at 281-367.
341. Most international commercial arbitrations... are conducted under the
auspices of institutions that are either devoted entirely to arbitration and
related means of dispute settlement, such as the London Court of Interna-
tional Arbitration (LCIA) and the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), or have arbitration as one of their important functions, such as the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce.
Lowenfeld, International Arbitration, supra note 270, at 333.
342. Id. at 282.
343. Id. at 332. An important qualification is that a country may have "the right to
refuse enforcement of an award where the 'recognition or enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy of that country."' Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473
U.S. at 638 (quoting the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, Art. V(2)(b), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520).
344. Lowenfeld, International Arbitration, supra note 270, at 343-44; see also David
W. Rivkdn, Avoiding the Uncertainty of Foreign Courts, CCM Am. Law. Corp. Couns.
Mag., Aug. 1996, at 52A, 53A ("Arbitration awards are final and binding, and, under
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virtual certainty. "If the agreement to arbitrate contains a choice-of-
law clause, it is virtually always followed." 5
To the extent a judicial resolution is desired, an alternative to an
arbitration clause is a clause selecting the forum in which any dispute
will be litigated. A typical forum selection clause might provide that
"all (or specified) disputes arising out of or related to this agreement
shall be resolved in the High Court of Justice in London" or "in the
Supreme Court of New York County" or in some other named fo-
rum." 6 Such a clause has two effects. First, it constitutes consent by
each party to be sued in the chosen forum.3 7 Second, it deprives
courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction over the parties and the
controversy of jurisdiction to hear the case.348
the New York Convention, it is exceedingly difficult to set aside an arbitration
award.").
345. Lowenfeld, International Arbitration, supra note 270, at 338.
346. lat at 281.
347. Il
348. Id.; see, e.g., Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) ("[W]e
conclude that the forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should
be set aside."); Unterweser Reederei G.M.B.H. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., [1968] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 158 (C.A.) ("It is always open to parties to stipulate... that a particular
Court shall have jurisdiction over any dispute arising out of their contract.").
The level of certainty normally associated with choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
clauses in international agreements was recently thrown into some level of chaos due
to a Virginia district court's decision, in the context of a proposed settlement involv-
ing Lloyd's of London, that an agreement providing for British courts and British law
was unenforceable. Allen v. Lloyd's of London, No. CIV. A. 3:96CV522, 1996 WL
490177, at *22-26 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996).
In a brief order, the Fourth Circuit reversed. The circuit court stated: "[T]he
court's decision rests on its determination, to be articulated in a later opinion, that the
contractual provisions among the parties selecting the law of and a forum in the
United Kingdom should be enforced .... " Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923,
926 (4th Cir. 1996). The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to dismiss. Id. See generally Rachel Witmer, Reversal of Injunction
Removes Threat to Lloyd's Reorganization, Lloyd's Says, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1060-61 (Aug. 30, 1996) (discussing the Allen decision); John J. Fialka, SEC
Claims Parts of Lloyd's Pact Violate Securities Laws of the U.S., Wall St. J., Aug. 13,
1996, at B7 (describing the Allen controversy generally, including the dispute over the
exclusive jurisdiction provision).
Subsequently, a fractured three-judge panel in the Ninth Circuit, in a different case
involving Lloyd's, held that choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions would not
be given effect insofar as they would operate as an improper waiver of the protection
of the United States securities laws. The court stated: "The Securities Acts' an-
tiwaiver provisions themselves render the Choice Clauses void, making it unnecessary
to examine whether enforcement of the clauses would be reasonable ..... Richards v.
Lloyd's of London, Nos. 95-55747, 95-56467, 1997 WL 94054, at *7 (9th Cir. Mar. 6,
1997). While conceding that its holding would likely cause Lloyd's to be "more cir-
cumspect in raising capital in the United States," the court explained that it did "not
believe that we should turn the clock back to 1929 or introduce caveat emptor as the
rule governing the solicitation in the United States of investments in securities by
residents of the United States." Id. at *8.
In a strongly-worded dissent, one member of the Ninth Circuit panel asserted "[tihe
same reasoning would bring protections under our securities laws to anyone who loses
his or her savings betting on chicken fights in Zamboanga." Id. at *10 (Goodwin, J.,
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Where a forum selection clause is desired, though, the parties to the
contract need be careful. Though forum selection clauses are gener-
ally enforceable as a matter of international law, the law of the forum
selected may be resistant to the acceptance of jurisdiction absent some
level of contact between that forum and either the parties or the un-
derlying dispute. 9 Before a particular forum is selected, therefore,
its law as to the acceptance of jurisdiction over international disputes
needs to be investigated.
Finally, aside from arbitration or forum selection clauses, parties to
a contract may agree to reasonable limitations upon their obligations
and damages. As in the United States, such provisions will generally
be enforced in foreign courts.
350
H. So lt ls Not So Bad
Though the prospect of potential liability in more than 185 separate
nations may seem somewhat daunting, the reality is that, owing
largely to the procedural constraints placed upon litigation in foreign
courts, the overall risk of substantial losses may be less than the analo-
gous risk in the United States.351 That is an irony, of course, that is
not likely to be lost on international litigants.
For that reason, it is entirely possible that a United States account-
ing firm transmitting financial information throughout the world may
never have to experience litigation in foreign courts at all. It is en-
tirely possible that foreign litigants, considering the procedural and
concurring and dissenting). Pointing out that the "implications of this holding on in-
ternational business transactions are not likely to lubricate commerce," the dissent
concluded that the majority's holding was "strange, and troubling." Id. at *11.
According to one press report, Lloyd's intends to seek a rehearing before the full
Ninth Circuit. See John J. Fialka, Appeals Court Rules Americans Can Sue Lloyd's of
London in U.S., Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1997, at B9.
349. See Lowenfeld, International Arbitration, supra note 270, at 281-82.
350. See generally Domke on Commercial Arbitration, § 44:01 (Gabriel M. Wilner
ed., 3d ed. 1995 & Supp. 1996) (discussing arbitration agreements for international
transactions, noting that "[o]ther matters that, depending on the circumstances, might
usefully be indicated in the arbitration clause include... possible acceptable remedies
such as liquidated damages"). But cf St. Luke's Hosp. v. SMC Computer Sys., Inc.,
Nos. 92-1205, 92-1206, 1993 WL 188457, at *10 (6th Cir. June 1, 1993) ("There is no
doubt that an arbitrator, if he so decides, may indeed refuse to enforce such a damage
limitation clause on the ground of unconscionability or on other grounds ... .
351. As one scholar on international litigation has said:
For a variety of reasons, an American forum has proven to be especially
attractive to foreign litigants. Among the factors that have attracted foreign
litigants are contingency fee arrangements that are largely forbidden abroad,
strict liability rules, the ability to obtain punitive damages which are gener-
ally not provided for abroad, the possibility of having a jury, broad pre-trial
discovery, and the rule that unlike the rule prevailing abroad, a loser need
not pay the attorney's fees of its opponent. Conversely, a foreign forum may
be selected because it has no jury in civil cases, there is no pre-pre-trial dis-
covery, and the losing party must pay its opponent's attorney's fees.
Smit, supra note 296, at 59.
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substantive issues discussed above, will elect to fie their claims in the
United States.
CONCLUSION
In the new century of financial reporting, both lawyers and account-
ants may be fairly busy. Those structuring financial reporting rela-
tionships will find themselves grappling with new principles of law to
be fashioned in technological contexts in which precedent is adaptable
only with the exercise of considerable intellectual effort. Litigators
will face a particular challenge in presenting to courts not only the
intricacies of innovative financial reporting systems, but the need for
the court to think through the business and economic implications of
each new decision.
In this new world, everyone will need to keep a careful watch. It is
critical to innovation in financial reporting that the rules of liability be
driven not by the desire to spread risk, the availability of insurance, or
sympathies for a particular plaintiff-but by a realistic system of liabil-
ity in which wrongdoers are held accountable, but financial reporting
systems are free to evolve. Experience has taught that unsophistica-
ted courts can give rise to short-sighted liability determinations that
send the law careening in particularly unfortunate directions, incapa-
ble of being yanked back for years or even decades to come. It is far
better to set the law out on the correct path at the outset.
The next century of financial reporting, therefore, will ask much of
both the accounting and the legal professions. There is every reason
to believe that both are up to the challenge.
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